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The dissertation is composed by two chapters.
In the rst one, I study the role of credit constraints and incomplete markets in
the short run transmission of monetary shocks, using the superneutrality result that
would obtain from preference separability in the Sidrauski model under complete
markets as a benchmark. I nd that money demand heterogeneity stemming from
binding credit constraints invalidates the superneutrality result. I show this result
under two alternative settings. In a simple two agents model, with heterogeneity in
the rates of time preference, whether positive shocks to the growth rate of money are
expansionary or contractionary crucially depends on the transfer scheme adopted by
the monetary authority to rebate seigniorage transfers: redistributional e¤ects implied
by symmetric lump-sum transfers are contractionary, while wealth-neutral transfers
are expansionary. In a model with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, the approximate
aggregation property fails to hold due to the high degree of heterogeneity of money
demand and to the properties of the cross-sectional distribution of money holdings,
suggesting the inadequacy of the representative agent assumption and the need for a
more elaborate approximation of the wealth distribution to predict prices.
In the second chapter, we propose a real business cycle model with labor and
credit market frictions in which borrowing is conditional on employment status. Rel-
ative to a conventional set up, and as long as credit is valued positively, our model
generates a non-standard labor/leisure trade o¤ that induces job applicants to accept
lower wages and rms to post more vacancies, ultimately increasing employment. A
shock to the demand of durable goods, by increasing the collateral value, reduce the
opportunity cost of working, and generates an increase in employment and output.
The transmission of a nancial shock that increases the loan to value ratio, is damp-
ened by the costs, in terms of leisure, incurred by the borrowers. We show that this
mechanism is able to generate the positive comovement between outstanding house-
hold debt and employment observed in the data, whereas a conventional model, in
which employment status is irrelevant for obtaining credit, predicts a counterfactual
negative comovement.
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1Chapter 1
Monetary Policy, Credit Constraints and
Incomplete Markets
1.1 Introduction
Probably the simplest framework available to macroeconomists to study the e¤ects of
monetary policy in general equilibrium is the neoclassical growth model augmented
with money-in-the-utility function (MIU) proposed by Sidrauski (1967).
The model, similarly to the vast majority of monetary models, builds on the
standard representative agent assumption, stemming from the presence of complete
nancial markets and symmetric preferences across agents.
One of the main properties of this model is the superneutrality of money, that
is the fact that real variables (except real balances) are invariant to changes in the
growth rate of money supply. Assuming inelastic labor supply, this feature holds
under general assumptions in steady state, while it requires separability between
consumption and real balances to hold in the transition path towards the steady
state.
The simplicity and the popularity of this framework1 makes it a natural laboratory
for studying the implication of relaxing assumptions which are shared with more
sophisticated models.
The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate the robustness of the predictions
1Quoting Reis (2007): "It is often the rst monetary model in courses and textbooks, and it is
the starting point for most monetary models that feature capital accumulation."
2concerning the dynamics of this model once the representative agent assumption is
relaxed and nancial frictions, in the form of credit constraints, are introduced.
I will proceed towards the goal of the paper in three steps: rst, I will present
a simple two period partial equilibrium model to show how the presence of binding
credit constraints a¤ects the demand for real balances; second, in order to under-
stand the general equilibrium implications of the above assumptions, I will propose
a Sidrauski model with two agents one of which is subject to credit frictions; third,
I will introduce an incomplete markets version of the model in which agents face
idiosyncratic labor income risk.
The theoretical contribution of the paper is twofold: one hand it sheds light on the
relationship between credit market frictions and money demand, and on the other it
provides a rst attempt to evaluate the role played by the contemporaneous presence
of idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty in the transmission of monetary shocks.
The largest part of the existing literature that analyses the short run e¤ects of
monetary policy both from a positive or a normative perspective, relies on the com-
plete markets-representative agent assumption. This assumption is without loss of
generality as long as perfect aggregation is possible. That is, the behavior of aggre-
gate variables in a context in which agents enjoying di¤erent wealth levels share the
same marginal propensities to save and consume will mimic that of a representative
agent economy. On the other hand, if the presence of a non trivial cross sectional
distribution of wealth is associated with heterogeneity in the optimal consumption
and saving decisions, then we ought to expect that relaxing the representative agent
assumption, could deliver equilibrium prices and allocations and aggregate dynamics
di¤erent form those obtained under the standard paradigm. Furthermore, provided
that the distribution of wealth is endogenously determined and is allowed to vary
across di¤erent states of the world, it would be possible that the transmission of
policy shocks to the economy could be state-dependent as well. Finally, within an
heterogeneous agents framework, it is possible to evaluate the redistributive e¤ects of
3a policy intervention.
Macroeconomic research in the last couple of decades has increasingly devoted its
e¤orts towards the goal of understanding the role played by credit frictions and mar-
ket incompleteness in di¤erent elds and by focussing on both their long run and short
run implications. Examples of long run models can be found for instance in the con-
sumption and savings literature (e.g. Aiyagari (1994), Huggett (1993),Marcet et al.
(2007)), in the scal policy literature (e.g. Aiyagari (1995),Domeij and Heathcote
(2004)), and in the asset pricing literature (Aiyagari and Gertler (1991)).
Similarly, after the seminal work of Krusell et al. (1998) who introduced the con-
cept of approximate aggregation, that is as long as heterogeneity in optimal decisions
involves households whose marginal contribution in the determination of aggregate
quantities is negligible, a large body of research dealing with the contemporaneous
presence of idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty ourished. For example, Heath-
cote (2005) analyses the e¤ects of temporary tax changes with incomplete markets,
Krusell and Smith (1997) and Storesletten et al. (2007) evaluate the role of market
incompleteness in innite horizon and life cycle economies in the determination of
the equity premium, Krusell et al. (2010) embed labor market search and matching
frictions in an incomplete market model to study the welfare e¤ects of unemployment
insurance programmes.
Conversely, the fact that the existing literature has overlooked the implications
of market incompleteness for the transmission of monetary policy shocks, as stated
in Heathcote et al. (2009) is indeed surprising since, on one hand there has been
signicant e¤ort in understanding the long run e¤ects of ination with partial insur-
ance (e.g. Imrohoroglu (1992), Erosa and Ventura (2002), Algan and Ragot (2010) )
and on the other, evidence of sizeable redistributive e¤ects of ination documented
by Doepke and Schneider (2006) for the US and by Meh and Terajima (2008) for
Canada is clearly suggestive of the inadequacy of the complete markets set up.
The paper closer to this is Algan and Ragot (2010), in which it is shown that
4partial insurance and credit constraints break the long-run neutrality of the Sidrauski
model: the presence of credit constrained households triggers heterogeneity in money
demand which in turn is responsible for an augmented precautionary savings motive
as steady state ination rises; redistributive e¤ects of ination work in the opposite
direction by providing extra insurance to ("cash") poor agents; overall, this two e¤ects
together produce an hump shaped relationship between capital and ination in the
long run that seem consistent with the data.
Consequently, this paper2 extends Algan and Ragot (2010) allowing for aggregate
uncertainty, and aims at complementing the current literature by providing in a simple
setup a few insights that could result useful to understand how monetary shocks
are transmitted under market incompleteness on one hand, and to quantitatively
assess whether the representative agent assumption can be considered without loss of
generality, on the other.
The main results of the paper are the following. First, I show that the presence of
binding borrowing constraints, determines an heterogeneous demand for money across
agents which invalidates the short run superneutrality result even in a set up without
idiosyncratic uncertainty. Second, the departure from superneutrality is increasing in
the size of constrained agents in the economy and in the tightness of the borrowing
constraint. Third, whether an increase in the growth rate of money causes an ex-
pansion or a contraction crucially depends on the transfer policy of the central bank:
if seigniorage transfers are engineered in a way to neutralize redistributive e¤ects it
is expansionary, if they are distributed symmetrically it is contractionary. Fourth,
after having allowed for uninsurable labor income risk I show how the presence of
2Accidentally, I recently found out that Algan et al. (2011) are working on a paper very similar
to this one. Despite the obvious complementarity, few di¤erences are worth noticing, though. While
they assume complementarity between consumption and real balances and propose an utility function
with non constant elasticity of substitution to obtain a distribution of money across housholds
consistent with the one found in the data, I assume separability in order to use the short run
neutrality result obtained under complete markets as a benchmark. Moreover, while in their model
the only source of uncertainty is represented by monetary shocks, I allow for the presence of an
aggregate shock to productivity to analyze whether the monetary transmission changes over the
business cycle.
5precautionary savings motives generates substantial heterogeneity in money demand
across agents which invalidates the approximate aggregation property of Krusell et al.
(1998).
1.2 A two-period toy model
In order to gain intuition on how the presence of borrowing constrained agents leads to
heterogeneity in the demand for real balances, I propose a simple extension of the two-
period, perfect foresight, partial equilibrium model studied in the permanent income-
life cycle literature, with an endowment economy populated by two agents, one of
which is borrowing constrained, and whose preferences are dened over consumption
c and real balances m.
1.2.1 Unconstrained agent
The unconstrained agent, solves:
maxU (c1;m1) + U (c2;m2)
st
c1 + k1 +m1 = y1 (1.1)
c2 +m2 = Rk1 +
m1

+ y2 (1.2)
where y are the non monetary endowments, k is an asset that pays a gross interest
R in the following period, while  is the gross ination rate in period 2.
The rst order conditions can be written as :
Um1 (c1;m1) = Uc1 (c1;m1)

R  1
R

(1.3)
Uc1 (c1;m1) = RUc2 (c2;m2) (1.4)
Uc2 (c2;m2) = Um2 (c2;m2) : (1.5)
6It is useful to consolidate the budget constraints (1.1) and (1.2) to obtain the
intertemporal budget constraint :
c1 +
c2
R
+m1

R  1
R

+
m2
R
= y1 +
y2
R
(1.6)
It is possible to identify the e¤ects that a change in ination have on the optimal
allocations as follows: rst, a substitution e¤ect between m1 and c1 as shown in
(1.3); second, from the Euler equation in (1.4), an intertemporal substitution between
todays and tomorrows consumption (through the dependence of Uc1 on c1 and m1);
third, by looking at the intertemporal budget constraint, a change in the absolute
price of m1 that operates as an income e¤ect3.
How these channels modify the optimal allocations depends on the class of pref-
erences adopted. I will consider here the following CES specication common in the
macroeconomic literature :
U (c;m) =
1
1  

c1 b + (1  )m1 b 1 1 b (1.7)
where b is the inverse of the (nominal) interest rate elasticity of money demand,
and  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It might be useful
to recall that if b = , preferences are separable in consumption and real balances
and that the special case b =  = 1 reduces to log-separability.
3The derivative of the price of real balances with respect to tomorrow ination
@(R 1R )
@ is positive
and equal to 1R2 :
7Under these assumptions and after a few steps of algebra, (1.3)-(1.5) become:
m1 =


(1  )

R  1
R
  1
b
c1
c2 = c1 (R)
1

8><>:
 + (1  )
h

(1 )
 
R 1
R
i b 1b
 + (1  )   
1 
 b 1
b
9>=>;
1

 b
1 b
m2 =


1  
  1
b
c2:
Depending on the absolute and relative size of b and  we obtain di¤erent alloca-
tions following an increase in ination: the intratemporal substitution e¤ect between
consumption and real balances decreases as b increases; if b >  (b < ) ; the uncon-
strained agent, will postpone (advance) consumption whereas with separability there
is no intertemporal substitution in consumption. It follows that, under separability4,
which is the case I will analyze in the remainder of the paper, only two e¤ects are at
work: the income and the (intratemporal) substitution e¤ect. An increase in ination
reduces the ratio of real balances over consumption through the substitution e¤ect,
and produces a negative income e¤ect. Under a log-separable specication the two
e¤ects on todays consumption cancel out, so that the only net e¤ect is a reduction in
real balances. In the more general separable case, if b =  > 1 (b =  < 1) the income
(substitution) e¤ect on consumption dominates, reducing (increasing) todays and to-
morrows consumption with the same proportion; as a result the overall reduction of
m1will be coeteris paribus smaller (larger). In gures 41 - 43 I provide a graphical
analysis of the above results under separability, assuming a constant endowment pro-
le, for values of  equal to 1.01,1.03 and 1.05, and values for b =  equal to 0.5,1 and
2, respectively . On the left panels I show the behavior of the intertemporal budget
4In the remainder of this section I also assume a constant endowment prole (i.e. y1 = y2).
This assumption together with the constant consumption prole due to separability, guarantees that
m1
m2
= RR 1 > 1, which in turn implies that the unconstrained agent is a borrower, and that the
borrowing constraint is binding for the agent of the second type.
8constraint and of the indi¤erence curves in the two dimensional space (c1;m1); on the
right panels the analysis is carried on the space (c1; c2)
1.2.2 Constrained agent
Di¤erent is the situation faced by the constrained agent who values real balances not
only for the liquidity services she receives but also as a store of value. The constrained
agent, whose relevant variables are denoted with (0) solves:
maxU (c01;m
0
1) + U (c
0
2;m
0
2)
st
c01 + k
0
1 +m
0
1 = y
0
1
c02 +m
0
2 = Rk
0
1 +
m01

+ y02
k01 = 0
The intertemporal budget constraint for the constrained agent can be written as:
c01 +c
0
2 +m
0
2 = y
0
1 +y
0
2 (1.8)
The rst order conditions are :
Um1 (c
0
1;m
0
1) = Uc1 (c
0
1;m
0
1)

R  1
R

+
0
R
(1.9)
Uc1 (c
0
1;m
0
1) = RUc2 (c
0
2;m
0
2) + 
0 (1.10)
Uc2 (c
0
2;m
0
2) = Um2 (c
0
2;m
0
2) (1.11)
where 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint.
Unfortunately an explicit analytical solution of this model is unfeasible because
of the presence of the binding borrowing constraint. Nonetheless, thanks to numer-
ical analysis it is possible to establish the following results following an increase in
9tomorrows ination under the class of preferences represented in (1.7).
First, and di¤erently from the previous section, even with separability, and for
values of b and  in a plausible range (0.2-10), an increase of ination leads to an
intertemporal substitution towards todays relatively cheaper consumption which,
given the impossibility to borrow, must be "nanced" with a reduction in money
demand ultimately leading to a decrease in the m1
c1
ratio. Second, the size of this
adjustment is decreasing in b.
It is important to note, however, that the presence of the binding constraint,
produces much smaller (in absolute terms) reductions in real balances as compared
to the unconstrained agent case.
In gures (44)-(46) a graphical analysis similar to that mentioned in the previ-
ous section is performed for the constrained agent to illustrate the behavior of the
constrained e¢ cient allocations.
Finally, to summarize graphically the di¤erences due to credit market imperfec-
tions, in gures (47) and (48) I plot c1;m1; and the ratios m1c1 ; c2c1 for di¤erent values
of ; for the unconstrained and constrained case, respectively.
1.3 General equilibrium with two agents
In this section I present a DSGE version of the previous model to evaluate the role
played by binding borrowing constraints in the transmission of monetary shocks. To
do so I use as a benchmark the standard Sidrauski model which, under separability
and lump-sum seigniorage transfers, prescribes superneutrality of money around the
steady state5.
The economy is populated by a continuum of households and perfectly competitive
rms operating with neoclassical technology over the unit interval and a monetary
authority. A fraction of measure 1   ! of the household sector is assumed to have
5A full description of the Sidrauski model and its properties can be found in the second Chapter
of Walsh (2010).
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a higher time preference and consequently is relatively more impatient. Within each
group, households are assumed to be identical (or to have access to a full menu of
contingency claims delivering full risk sharing), allowing me to deal with two represen-
tative households. As is standard in the literature (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Iacoviello (2005)) heterogeneity in the rate of time preference together with su¢ ciently
small shocks su¢ ce to ensure the presence of binding borrowing constraints, allowing
me to refer to the two household as unconstrained and constrained, respectively.
1.3.1 Unconstrained household
The unconstrained household solves the following problem:
max
ct;mt;kt+1
E0
1X
t=0
tU (ct;mt)
st
ct + kt+1 +mt = kt (1 + rt   ) + mt 1
t
+ wtl +  t (1.12)
where l is leisure (assumed for simplicity constant), rt the (net) rental rate of
capital,  the depreciation rate for capital, wt the wage rate, and  t a lump-sum
transfer.
Preferences, are still assumed to be of the CES class as in (1.7) while the rst
order conditions of the problem, assuming separability, read as:
c bt =
1  

m bt + Et

c bt+1
t+1

(1.13)
c bt = Et

c bt+1 (1 + rt+1   )

(1.14)
where (1.13) is the money demand equation and (1.14) is the standard Euler
equation for consumption.
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1.3.2 Constrained household
The constrained household is identied by a higher rate of time preference entailing
a discount factor  < b and solves:
maxE0
1X
t=0
tU (c0t;m
0
t)
st
c0t + k
0
t+1 +m
0
t = k
0
t (1 + rt   ) +
m0t 1
t
+ wtl + 
0
t (1.15)
k0t+1  0 (1.16)
Assuming preferences as in (1.7) and separability, the rst order conditions of this
problem are:
c0 bt =
1  

m0 bt + Et

c0 bt+1
t+1

(1.17)
c0 bt = 
0
t + Et

c0 bt+1 (1 + rt+1   )

(1.18)
where 0t is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint (1.16)
indicating the increase in lifetime utility stemming from the possibility to borrow.
1.3.3 Firms
Firms are assumed to be perfectly competitive, to rent capital and hire inelastically
supplied labor in order to produce output Y operating a neoclassical production
function :
Yt = ZtK
a
t l
1 
where Zt is an exogenous stochastic variable representing the state of technology,
and assumed to follow an AR(1) process.
Solution to the rms prot maximization problem lead to the following standard
12
price equations:
rt = Zt

Kt
l
 1
(1.19)
wt = (1  )Zt

Kt
l

(1.20)
1.3.4 Monetary authority
I assume that the nominal stock of money Mt evolves according to:
Mt = tMt 1 (1.21)
where t is assumed to be stochastic and to follow an AR(1) process.
In real terms, (1.21) implies:
Mt = t
t
Mt 1 (1.22)
whereMt is the aggregate level of real balances.
As a consequence, the seigniorage revenues equal to:
Tt =
Mt  Mt 1
Pt
=
(t   1)Mt 1
t
(1.23)
Below I will consider two alternative transfer schemes: under the rst scenario, I
will assume that the monetary authority rebates seigniorage revenues to the house-
holds through an identical lump-sum transfer; under the second, in order to prevent
redistribution of wealth from cash rich households to cash poor households, I will con-
sider a transfer perceived ex-ante as lump-sum but ex-post proportional to beginning
of period real money holdings.
In other words, under the rst case I have:
 t = 
0
t =
(t   1)Mt 1
t
(1.24)
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in the second case instead:
 t =
(t   1)mt 1
t
(1.25)
 0t =
(t   1)m0t 1
t
(1.26)
1.3.5 Market clearing
In equilibrium, the following market clearing conditions for capital and real balances,
must hold:
K 
!Z
0
k (i) di = !k (1.27)
M 
!Z
0
m (i) di+
1Z
!
m0 (i) di = !m+ (1  !)m0 (1.28)
1.3.6 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a sequence of allocations fct; c0t;mt;m0t; kt;  t;  0t; Kt;Mg1t=0 and
values frt; wt;t; 0tg1t=0 such that equations (1.12) to (1.20) and either (1.24) or
equations (1.25) and (1.26) hold, together with the market clearing conditions (1.27)
and (1.28), the money process (1.22), and the relevant transversality conditions, given
a sequence of realizations for the exogenous variables fZt; tg1t=0 :
To investigate the properties of the model I will analyze the log-linearized solution
in the neighborhood of the unique non-stochastic steady state reported in Appendix
A.
1.3.7 Calibration
The parameter values chosen to calibrate the model follow Walsh (2010) and are
summarized in Table (3.1). The capital share parameter  has been set equal to 0:36
, the discount factor for the patient household  equal to 0:99, the depreciation rate for
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capital equal to 0:019 and the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
equal to 2, consistently with the real business cycle literature once the relevant time
period considered is one quarter. The preference parameter determining the relative
weight of consumption, , has been set equal to 0:99 leading to a steady state ratio
of real balances over consumption of 0:71 which is in line with the ratio of M1 over
consumption expenditures for the US over the last two decades. The steady state
value for the growth rate of money, ; has been set to 1:01, implying an ination rate
at annual frequency of 4 percent. The autocorrelation parameter and the standard
deviation of the exogenous process on the growth rate of money have been set equal
to 0:75 and 0:9 respectively.
The two remaining parameters are the impatients discount factor ; and the
share of patient household in the economy !. In the benchmark calibration following
Iacoviello (2005) I set  = 0:95 while following Iacoviello (2008) I set ! = 0:65:Given
that the above parameters together determine the aggregate e¤ect of the borrowing
constraints, to facilitate the economic intuition regarding the role played by borrowing
constraints I will consider alternative values for  and ! as well.
1.3.8 Results
In order to evaluate the role played by binding borrowing constraints in the trans-
mission of shocks to the growth rate of money supply, in Figure 49 I rst display the
impulse response functions (IRFs), in percentage deviation from steady state, under
three alternative values for the share of unconstrained agents, ! = f0:99; 0:65; 0:1g
and under the case of ex post proportional seigniorage transfers to shut o¤ redistrib-
utive e¤ects of monetary policy. It is important to recall, that as ! ! 1, so that
the economy is populated by unconstrained agents only, the model converges to the
textbook Sidrauski model, for which we know that preference separability implies
superneutrality in the dynamics.
On the other hand as ! decreases it is easy to observe that the superneutrality
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result is broken, since, for instance, the model displays an increase in savings for the
unconstrained households.
In order to understand the reasons for this result it is useful to recall one of the
insights of the toy model of section 1.2, namely, the fact that constrained agents
reduce by less the demand of real balances in presence of higher future ination.
As the share of constrained agents increases, the more the aggregate variables will
be inuenced by the behavior of these agents inducing the unconstrained agents to
participate the credit markets to absorb the distortions caused by the heterogeneity of
money demand. In particular, as ! decreases, the rst period negative response of real
aggregate money decreases in absolute terms, in turn reducing the contemporaneous
e¤ect on ination (see Figure 410). On the other hand, the weaker response of money
demand by the constrained agent continues in the following periods as can be noticed
by the attening of IRF, causing an increase in the persistence of aggregate money
which ultimately leads to a more persistent path for ination (see Figure 411). In
turn the unconstrained agents, in order to smooth consumption, respond to higher
ination in part by reducing the demand for real balances and in part by saving.
In Figures 412-414 I repeat the same exercise under the alternative scenario with
symmetric lump sum transfers. Intuitively this transfer policy redistributes wealth
from cash rich (unconstrained) agents to cash poor (constrained) agents. Comparing
the IRFs of impatient and patient consumption and of savings with those obtained
under neutral transfers, it is possible to note on one hand that impatients con-
sumption is now higher, and that as ! decreases the patient reduces her savings to
compensate the wealth loss.
To isolate this redistributive e¤ect I present in Figures 415-417 the IRFs asso-
ciated to a one-time (unexpected) temporary shock to money growth. While, with
ex-post proportional transfers and similarly to the standard representative agent, only
anticipated changes in the growth rate of money have an e¤ect on the real economy,
in the model with binding constraints and lump sum transfers also unanticipated
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changes in the money stock have real e¤ects.
1.4 Incomplete markets model
In this section I extend the previous analysis assuming that ex ante identical house-
holds are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risk a¤ecting labor income. The lack
of full insurance generates an endogenous distribution of wealth across households,
which, together with the impossibility to borrow, determines an endogenous fraction
of constrained consumers. The presence of aggregate uncertainty in terms of shocks
to aggregate productivity and money growth rates, in turn implies that the both the
wealth distribution and the fraction of constrained agents are time-varying.
Finally, I assume that both idiosyncratic shocks, e, and aggregate shocks, z and
, follow independent rst-order Markov processes.
Since the production side of the economy is unaltered with respect to the previous
model I refer the reader to section 1.3.3.
1.4.1 The households problem
With the intent to be formally consistent with the solution methods employed in
section 1.4.3 , and analogously to the related literature, I formulate the households
problem recursively. To do so it is important to rst identify the relevant state
variables. The individual state variables are the beginning of period wealth level
a = k (1 + r   ) + m

; the lump sum transfer,  6, and the idiosyncratic shock e:
The aggregate state variables, which are relevant for determining prices, are the
endogenous distribution over wealth and individual productivity   (a; e) and the ag-
gregate shocks z and .
6As it will become clearer in the next section, including seigniorage transfers as a state variable
would not be necessary in the case of a symmetric transfer policy, on the other hand with ex-post
proportional transfers I would need decision rules dened over  . Hence I use here the more general
formulation of the problem.
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The presence of aggregate shocks implies that   (a; e) evolves over time according
to a law of motion H such that  0 = H ( ; z; ; z0; 0): that is the cross-sectional
distribution of wealth evolves over time because of a mix of endogenous (i.e. the
policy functions that in equilibrium generate H) and exogenous (i.e. the aggregate
shocks realizations) factors.
The recursive formulation of the household problem is therefore:
V (a;  ; e;  ; z; ) = max
m0;k0
fU (c;m0) + E [V (a0;  0; e0;  0; z0; 0)je; z; ]g
s.t.
c+ k0 +m0 = a+ w (K; l; z) le+  ;
a0 = (1 + r0 (K 0; l; z0)  )k0 + m
0
0 (M00;M0; 0) ;
 0 =
(0   1)M0
0 (M00;M0; 0) (1.29)
 0 = H ( ; z; ; z0; 0) (1.30)
k0 > 0:
where r () and w () are given by (1.19) and (1.20), respectively and () derives
from (1.22).
Solving this problem generates the following decision rules for real money holdings
and capital (and residually for consumption) :
m0 = fm(a;  ; e;  ; z; ) (1.31)
k0 = fk(a;  ; e;  ; z; ) (1.32)
c = fc(a;  ; e;  ; z; ) (1.33)
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1.4.2 Equilibrium
Market clearing in the real money market and capital markets require at any point
in time:
Z Z
fm(a;  ; e;  ; z; )d  (a; e) = M (1.34)Z Z
fk(a;  ; e;  ; z; )d  (a; e) = K (1.35)
A recursive competitive equilibrium is therefore a law of motion H; individual
functions fV; fm; fkg, and pricing functions fr; w;g such that: (1) fV; fm; fkg solve
the above problem given the stochastic laws of motion for fe; z; g; (2) fr; wg are
given by (1.19) and (1.20); (3) is consistent with 1.22; (4) the real money market
and the capital market clear according to (1.34) and (1.35); (5) H is generated by
ffm; fkg.
1.4.3 Solution algorithm
The main di¢ culty associated to this class of models is due to the presence of an
innite dimensional time varying object, namely the distribution over wealth and
individual productivity   (a; e). To overcome this problem I adopt a solution strategy
along the same lines of Krusell et al. (1998) who assume boundedly rational agents
that perceive future prices as the result of the laws of motion of a (nite) subset of
moments describing   (a; e) and of the exogenous aggregate shocks.
By guessing that approximate aggregation holds for this economy, that is the
forecast error induced by using just the rst moments is small enough, this implies
that the recursive problem may be rewritten as:
V (a;  ; e;K;M; z; ) = max
m0;k0
fU (c;m0) + E [V (a0;  0; e0;K 0;M0; z0; 0)je; z; ]g
(1.36)
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s.t.
c+ k0 +m0 = a+ w (K; l; z) le+  ; (1.37)
a0 = (1 + r0 (K 0; l; z0)  )k0 + m
0
0 (M00;M0; 0) ; (1.38)
 0 =
(0   1)M0
0 (M00;M0; 0) (1.39)
logK 0 = Ak (z; ) +Bk (z; ) logK + Ck (z; ) logM; (1.40)
logM0 = Am (z; ) +Bm (z; ) logK + Cm (z; ) logM (1.41)
k0 > 0:
I now summarize my solution algorithm, while I refer the interested reader to
Appendix B for a more detailed exposition.
1. Given the shocks properties create a Markovian transition matrix P
2. Select guessed values for Ak; Bk; Ck; Am; Bm; Cm and choose an initial value for
V:
3. Solve 1.36 with value function iteration (and Howard improvement algorithm)
interpolating at each iteration V at values a0;  0; K 0;M0 obtained through (1.38),
(1.39),(1.40),(1.41) and (1.22) to obtain m0 = fm(a;  ; e;K;M; z; ) and k0 =
fk(a;  ; e;K;M; z; ).
4. Use the decision rules to simulate the economy with the a modied version of
the histogram method proposed by Young (2010), that ensures market clearing
in the money market at each period, (and that allows for ex-post proportional
transfers if necessary) to obtain a su¢ ciently long time series for K and M:
5. Use the time series for K and M to estimate parameters in (1.40) and (1.41)
6. If the obtained parameter estimates are su¢ ciently close to the guessed ones
and the goodness of t is satisfactory, stop. Otherwise update the parameter
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values using the new estimates, keep the converged value of V , and go back to
3.
1.4.4 Model parameters
While I keep the structural parameters of the model unchanged with respect to those
of the two agents model, I present here the parametrization of the stochastic processes.
I use the same individual productivity process as the one in Algan and Ragot
(2010), which in turn follow Domeij and Heathcote (2004), where e evolves as a
Markov process with size ne = 3, and values equal to 3.50, 0.75 and 0.13. The
transition matrix Pe implies that it is not possible to move from one of the extreme
state to the other and it is equal to:
Pe =
26664
0:975 0:025 0
0:0037 0:9925 0:0037
0 0:025 0:975
37775 (1.42)
The money growth process  and the process for aggregate productivity z are
assumed to evolve according to a two-states Markov process with values 1.0145 and
1.0055 for , and 0.99,1.01 for z; while the transition matrices P and Pz are equal to:
P =
24 0:8 0:2
0:2 0:8
35 (1.43)
Pz =
24 0:875 0:125
0:125 0:875
35 (1.44)
1.4.5 Results
Following the same approach as in section 1.3, in this section I will rst analyze
the e¤ect of the two alternative transfer policies assuming that the only source of
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aggregate uncertainty is represented by the shock to the growth rate of nominal
money supply.
Thereafter I will conduct the analysis taking into account the joint presence of
monetary and aggregate productivity shocks, to determine whether the e¤ects of
monetary policy on real variables are dependent on the aggregate state of the economy
due to uctuations of the endogenous cross-sectional distribution of wealth.
Monetary policy shocks and ex-post proportional transfers
Since I am interested in disentangling the e¤ects due to money demand heterogeneity
from those related to the redistribution of wealth under lump sum transfer, I rst
consider the model with wealth neutral transfers.
In order to evaluate the model properly, it is important to verify whether the
generated cross-sectional distribution of wealth is empirically plausible.
To do so, I rst calculate the empirical distribution of wealth using data from
the Survey of Consumer Finances in 2007. To be as consistent as possible with the
theoretical model, I considered data on nancial wealth (which is listed as FIN in SCF
Bulletin)7 as a proxy for the variable a in the model, while I consider liquid assets
(which is listed as LIQ in SCF bulletin and consists of all transaction accounts) as
a proxy for m ; nally non monetary assets k are proxied by the di¤erence between
nancial wealth and liquid assets.
Table 3.2 summarizes the distribution of wealth and of its components for the data
and the models: aside the well known di¢ culty, which this model shares with largest
part of the literature, to generate a distribution of wealth as skewed as the one found
in the data, it is important to stress two dimensions along which the model behaves
relatively poorly. First, the share of constrained households, which is computed as the
fraction of households with k = 0, is underestimated in the model; second the model
7This category includes liquid assets, certicate of deposits, bonds, stocks, investment funds
shares, cash value of whole life insurance, and other managed assets.
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predicts a more even distribution of monetary assets than the one found in the data.
Together, these two features imply on one hand that the model is underestimating
the "action" near the borrowing limit because fewer agents are in that neighborhood,
on the other, the model overestimates that "action" because the share of liquid assets
held by the poorest is higher than in the data.
Probably the most striking result, that, as we will see, holds also under the al-
ternative transfer policy, is that in this model approximate aggregation fails to hold.
This is evident by looking at the low R2 associated to the aggregate laws of motion
for real balances which I report together with their counterpart for capital below:
if  = l
logK 0 = 0:146 + 0:956 logK   0:00004 logM; R2 = 0:9971
logM0 =  3:256 + 0:984 logK + 0:00021 logM; R2 = 0:13
if  = h
logK 0 = 0:14 + 0:958 logK + 0:000001 logM; R2 = 0:9968
logM0 =  3:262 + 0:982 logK + 0:000003 logM; R2 = 0:122:
The reason for this can be found by looking at the decision rules for real balances,
which together with those for capital and consumption are presented in Figure 418:
optimal money holdings display signicant nonlinearities for a large range of individ-
ual wealth, implying a non trivial degree of heterogeneity in the share of money across
agents. Moreover, since as it is shown in Table 3.2, a signicant share of monetary
assets is held at low wealth levels, this implies that by keeping track of the mean
level of real balances only, produces large forecast errors in the prediction of future
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ination.
Whether a model generating a wealth distribution closer to the empirical one
could be overcome the lack of aggregation is unclear: following the argument I made
before, a larger fraction of constrained agents would most likely generate even larger
nonlinearities and a higher degree of heterogeneity in money demand, worsening the
issue of aggregation; a more skewed distribution of liquid assets would imply that
the weight of poor householdsdecisions on aggregate quantities would be lower, and
possibly lead to the opposite direction.
On the contrary, the fact that decision rules for holdings of capital are almost
linear in wealth with the exception of very poor agents whose share of capital is
negligible in the aggregate, allows for small errors in the forecasting of future interest
rates.
While it is true that with such large forecast errors it would be hard to evaluate
quantitatively the model, it is still worthwhile, at least qualitatively, to analyze the
models predictions in light of the insights obtained in section 1.3.
In Figures 419-421 I plot, for a sub-sample of 200 periods, simulated series for
aggregate capital, money and consumption, conditional on the three levels of indi-
vidual productivity, e:In line with the intuition developed in the previous sections,
low income agents, which on average have low wealth as well, in presence of higher
growth rates of money and higher ination, being less able to smooth consumption
over time, anticipate consumption reducing capital and, to a lower extent, money
holdings (it is possible show that agents in a small neighborhood of the borrowing
constraint actually increase money holdings because money is the only store of value
available to them). Opposite is the behavior of high income agents, who are more
e¤ective consumption smoothers, and simply substitute capital holdings for money.
Overall, as it is shown in Figure 422, the total variation of capital is quite low sug-
gesting a close-to-superneutrality result. Still, with a wealth distribution closer to the
data, that is with poor agents holding fewer assets and few rich households holding
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more assets, it is possible that the aggregate time series for capital would mimic that
of high income agents, leading to an increase of aggregate capital and output during
monetary expansions.
Monetary policy shocks and lump sum transfers
I now turn to analyze the model properties under symmetric lump sum transfers.
Also in this case I nd that the approximate aggregation result of Krusell et al.
(1998) does not hold as it is clear from the equilibrium ALMs for aggregate capital
and real balances:
for  = l
logK 0 = 0:0066 + 0:998 logK + 0:00026 logM; R2 = 0:9996
logM0 =  1:568 + 0:477 logK + 0:00021 logM; R2 = 0:2497
for  = h
logK 0 = 0:0054 + 0:9984 logK + 0:00023 logM; R2 = 0:9997
logM0 =  1:578 + 0:476 logK + 0:00022 logM; R2 = 0:2667
Even though the forecast error for real balances is quite relevant, its size is smaller
than the one obtained under wealth neutral transfers. The intuition is straightfor-
ward: lump-sum transfers redistribute wealth from cash rich to cash poor house-
holds, moving density towards the mean of the distribution and therefore reducing
the impact of the nonlinearities present at low wealth levels (see Figure 423) on the
determination of aggregate quantities.
From Figures 425-427 it is possible to qualitatively understand how equilibrium
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allocations are a¤ected by the wealth redistribution e¤ect. Low income agents receiv-
ing on average a transfer that more than o¤sets the loss attributable to the ination
tax, will increase consumption and their share of non-monetary assets (see right panel
of Figure 424 to view how the portfolio composition varies for low wealth levels and
for di¤erent realizations of the individual productivity process) after a monetary ex-
pansion. Conversely, high income and rich agents incur in a wealth loss that lead
them to dissave in order to smooth consumption.
In terms of economy-wide variables, since the saving rate of wealthy agents is
higher, the total e¤ect of an exogenous increase in the growth rate of nominal money,
leads, similarly to what happened in the two-agent model, to a decrease in the level
of capital (see Figure 428).
It is important to note also, that lump-sum transfers in this model provide a
further channel of insurance for households with low wealth levels, reducing precau-
tionary savings motives, and, consequently, the overall stock of capital in the economy
(compare top panels of Figure 422 and 428).
1.5 Conclusions
The main goal of this paper is to provide a few insights on the role played by market
incompleteness and borrowing constraints in the transmission of monetary shocks.
Given the computational di¢ culties associated to this task, and, to the best of my
knowledge, the lack of literature on the topic, I propose an extension of the simple
Sidrauski model, which allows tractability on one hand, and whose properties are well
established, on the other.
I rst developed some intuition concerning money demand heterogeneity due to
binding borrowing constraints in a simple two-period endowment economy, to nd
that in presence of higher future ination, di¤erently from unconstrained agents,
constrained agents substitute consumption intertemporally and are less willing to
substitute intratemporally consumption for money.
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I then introduced a simple two-agent DSGE model, in which agents di¤er in the
terms of degree of impatience. This model allowed me to show the general equilib-
rium e¤ects of money demand heterogeneity and of alternative seigniorage transfer
policies. If transfers are wealth neutral, and the fraction of constrained agents in line
with empirical ndings, a persistent increase in the growth rate of money leads to a
mild increase in capital and output. If transfers are symmetrically distributed in a
lump-sum fashion, the associated wealth redistribution from cash rich to cash poor
households reverse the relationship between money growth and capital.
I nally presented the incomplete markets version of the Sidrauski model with
uninsurable labor income risk. Due to the high degree of nonlinearities in the optimal
decision rules for money across households, the approximate aggregation result of
Krusell et al. (1998) fails to hold. The model seems to, at least qualitatively, predict
results that are in line with the intuition developed through the paper.
To be able to quantitatively assess the model, a more elaborate approximation
of the cross sectional wealth distribution is likely to be needed in order to reduce
signicantly the forecast error for ination. Intuition suggests that keeping track of
features of the left tail of the distribution is the right direction to follow.
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Chapter 2
Unemployment, Credit Frictions and the
Business Cycle (with E. Santoro)
2.1 Introduction
In the last two decades or so, the real business cycle literature (RBC), originated
from the work of Kydland and Prescott (1982), has expanded in several directions
with the intent of replicating and explaining empirical features of the business cycle
which were at odds with either the assumptions, or the predictions, of the model in
its original formulation.
Probably, the two most relevant (and successful) extensions of the standard RBC
model, have been those that studied the role of labor market frictions on one hand,
and the role credit market frictions on the other.
In the rst case, starting from Pissarides (1985), the assumption of Walrasian
labor market has been challenged in favor of a more realistic set up, in which the
process of matching rmsjob vacancies with job applicants, provides a rationale for
the presence of involuntary unemployment. This framework has been used to analyze
the propagation mechanism originating from the labor market, and it has been tested
against the empirical evidence on the uctuations of labor market related variables,
as in Andolfatto (1996), Merz (1995) and more recently in Cheron and Langot (2004),
Hall (2005), Shimer (2005) and Gertler and Trigari (2006)1.
1A full review of the literature on search and matching frictions in the labor market is beyond
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In the second, while the standard RBC model assumes that nancial and credit
conditions do not a¤ect the real economy, it has been shown (see Bernanke and Gertler
(1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) among others) that the
presence of endogenous borrowing limits, originating from an agency problem between
borrowers and lenders, causes, through the feedback e¤ect that collateral assets price
have on the borrowing capacity, a powerful shock propagation mechanism, also known
as the nancial accelerator.
On the other hand, one may nd a little surprising that the potential interaction
between labor and credit market frictions has been, until recently, overlooked by the
current literature.
This seems especially true by looking at Figure 4292, that shows a strong positive
comovement between total hours worked and household debt, which seems counter-
factual to the prediction by which debt should decrease (or net assets increase) during
expansions.
In Figure 430, we move a step forward, and we display, separately, the behavior
of employment rate and average hours per worker against outstanding mortgage debt,
to show that the major contribution of this comovement comes from the behavior of
the extensive margin.
Moreover, in spite of a large body of empirical work studying the determinants of
successful loan/mortgage applications, and nding labor-related variables such as the
employment status strongly signicant (Munnell et al. (1996)3 Laeven et al. (2008)
Agarwal et al. (2011)), existing models with credit frictions are silent in this regard,
and simply tie ones borrowing capacity to the value of a collateral asset.
In light of the above evidence we ask, rst, whether a model with labor and credit
the scope of the paper, a good survey is Rogerson et al. (2005).
2A similar gure can be found in Campbell and Hercowitz (2011).
3Quoting the authors "...Specically, any labor market variable that a¤ects the probability that
the applicant may su¤er a spell of unemployment would a¤ect the expected protability of the loan.
The mortgage application form contains considerable information concerning the labor force status
of the potential borrower."
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frictions with a standard borrowing constraint is capable to generate the observed
comovement between outstanding debt and labor market variables, and second, how
relevant the presence of a borrowing constraint accounting for the employment status
of the borrower, is for understanding such dynamics.
To address the above questions, we present a model with labor and credit market
frictions in which access to credit may be granted to employed household members
only. In other words, and di¤erently from existing models, we assume that employ-
ment status, together with collateralized assets, determine ones ability to borrow.
Under the assumption that employment status is relevant for accessing credit,
labor related decisions at the household level depart from the standard labor/leisure
trade o¤. While under the conventional set up, the value of a job (worker) is simply
a function of the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption and
the real wage, in our model households benet from working also because it provides
access to credit.
As a result, as long as an extra amount of credit is valued positively by the house-
hold (i.e. the borrowing constraint is binding), in our model vis-a-vis the standard
one, an increase in productivity on one hand will further increase the willingness for
a member to actively participate to the labor market, and on the other, will increase
his/her reservation wage less than proportionally. Everything else equal, this will pro-
vide a further incentive for rms to post vacancies, and consequently, in equilibrium
it will translate into an increased number of employed and into a less procyclical real
wage.
Our assumption on credit market participation highlights signicant di¤erences
in the transmission of preference and nancial shocks as well.
A positive change in the taste for durable goods, by increasing durable goods
prices and the borrowing capacity, increases the "value" of a job. Consequently, the
number of job applicants increases while their reservation wage decreases, leading to
an increase of employment and output and to a reduction of the real wage. In turn, a
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higher employment further increases the borrowing capacity and durable consumption
and prices.
On the other hand, within our model, an increase in borrowing capacity due to
an unexpected increase in the loan-to-value ratio, entails a weaker adjustment of
borrowing and of impatientsconsumption of durables. To take advantage of easier
credit conditions, borrowers need to be employed and consequently face a cost in terms
of leisure which reduces their willingness to borrow in comparison to a situation in
which employment status is irrelevant for credit.
These ndings, together, build the main result of the paper. While a model with
a conventional credit contract based upon collateralized asset values only, predicts,
in presence of labor market frictions, a negative comovement between debt and labor
market variables, assuming employment status as a requirement for qualifying for a
loan, provides a link between the two frictions which is consistent with the positive
comovement observed in the data.
Finally, we believe to contribute to the existing literature also under a more tech-
nical aspect. In our model, not only we allow for a distinction between intensive and
extensive margin of labor supply, but we endogenize both the labor market participa-
tion decision (hence allowing for voluntary unemployment) and the level of e¤ort in
the job search. In this way we believe we can provide a more complete and transparent
representation of the mechanisms into play.
A number of papers are related to this one. In terms of the underlying research
question the most closely related is Campbell and Hercowitz (2011). In order to
explain the positive comovement between household debt and total hours worked, they
present a partial equilibrium model with occasionally binding borrowing constraints,
in which a wage increase, by expanding the demand of durable goods, reduces the
resources available to the household. To counter the shortage of resources, households
increase their labor supply which further expands output.
In terms of modelling choices, Pescatori and Tasci (2011) analyze the wedge be-
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tween the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and the
marginal productivity of labor, in a model with search and matching frictions and
variable e¤ort (but without endogenous participation) in the labor market. They
highlight that the separation between intensive and extensive margin is key for ob-
taining a less volatile labor wedge.
Ravn (2008), introduces labor market participation in a search and matching
framework, without variable e¤ort, and nds a consumption-tightness puzzle which
relates the marginal utility of consumption to the labor market tightness. This rela-
tionship predicts procyclical unemployment and low volatility of labor market tight-
ness.
Finally, Andrés et al. (2011), present a model with both labor market and credit
frictions similar to ours to explain how the changes in credit market regulation have
a¤ected the comovement between labor-related variables. Di¤erently from us, they do
not allow for neither endogenous labor market participation nor variable e¤ort. Also,
they assume that both borrowers and lenders participate the labor market, and that
a trade union maximizes the joint surplus using the share of borrowers and lenders in
the population as weights. In this way, even in presence of di¤erent reservation wages
across the two groups of workers, the bargain process delivers a unique wage and a
unique number of hours worked. In our model,instead, we assume, that only impatient
household members can participate the labor market, while patient households earn
income through rms ownership, lending activities and real estate transactions and
can therefore be interpreted as rentiers.
2.2 The Model
We consider a search and matching model, with voluntary unemployment, variable
search e¤ort in which hired workers at time t start working in the following period.
The economy is populated by a continuum of households over the unit interval, and
it is composed by borrowers and savers, of measure ! and 1  !, respectively. There
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is assumed to be full consumption risk sharing within each household. Borrowers and
savers display di¤erent attitudes towards discounting their future, with borrowers
characterized by a lower discount factor. All households derive utility from consum-
ing non-durable goods supplied by a perfectly competitive production sector, as well
as from a durable good, whose total supply is constant at D. Furthermore, only the
impatient household members have access to the labor market, and, depending on
their employment status, can enjoy leisure time in di¤erent amounts. Debt accumula-
tion reects intertemporal trading between borrowers and savers. However, members
of the impatient household can access a loan only if they are employed. Finally,
similarly to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and to Iacoviello (2005) the loan contract is
designed in a way that impatient householdsborrowing is limited from above by the
discounted expected value of their stock of durables.
2.2.1 Borrowers
The representative impatient household maximizes the present discounted value of
their expected utility:
E0
1X
t=0
t
24 log  Cbt   &Ct 1+  t logDbt + 1N bt (1 Lt)1 '1 ' + 2U bt (1 et)1 'e1 'e
+3
 
1 N bt   U bt
 (1 h)1 'e
1 'e
35 ; (2.1)
where Dbt and C
b
t represent, respectively, durable and non-durable consumption , N
b
t
indicates the fraction of household members which are employed, which in turn is the
sum of Hbt 1; the fraction of members hired in t  1, and (1  )N bt 1 , the fraction of
employed members who kept their position from the previous period. Moreover,  is
the discount factor while ' denotes the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
and 'e is a parameter measuring the elasticity of e¤ort et in the job searching process.
Parameter  t determines the relative weight of durable consumption, and the time
subscript indicates that it may be subject to an exogenous disturbance. Finally by
setting & > 0 we allow for the presence of external habits in non-durable consumption.
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The labor force is F bt  N b + U b, while the pool of beginninig-of-period job
applicants is U bt . The following constraints must be satised for all t: C
b
t  0;
Dbt  0, 0  Lt  1;, 0  N bt  1; 0  U bt  1; N bt + U bt  1;
Maximization is subject to the following budget constraint:
Cbt +Qt
 
Dbt  Dbt 1

+Rt 1Bbt 1 = B
b
t +WtN
b
tLt;
and the law of motion of employment:
N bt = (1  )N bt 1 +Hbt 1;
where Qt is the relative price of the durable good (in units of non-durable goods),
Bbt denotes the level of debt (in real terms) at time t, Rt 1 is the gross real rate of
interest, Wt is the real wage.
Financial Constraints and Employment
We assume that credit is extended to each household member z in agreement with
the following collateral constraint:
Bbt (z)  It (z)tEt

Qdt+1D
b
t (z)
Rt

; (2.2)
where t 2 [0; 1] is the stochastic loan-to-value ratio, Bbt (z) is the amount of credit
that can be accessed by the zth member and Dbt (z) denotes the per-capita stock of
durables within the household. Finally, It (z) is an indicator function, such that:
It (z) =
8<: 0 if the zth member is unemployed at time t;1 otherwise.
The rationale behind the collateral constraint is that individuals can access a loan only
if they are employed. Otherwise the nancial constraint has the usual interpretation
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and can be rationalized in terms of limited enforcement (see Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) ): although the borrower could in principle default on his debt obligations,
losing the current value of the asset acts as a deterrent.
Aggregating (2.2) across household members returns the following aggregate (household-
specic) collateral constraint:
Bbt  t
 
N bt

Et

Qdt+1D
b
t
Rt

; (2.3)
where  can take value 0 or 1 to allow for a solution in which employment status
is irrelevant for accessing the credit market. Thus, according to (2.3), borrowing is
determined, along with the discounted value of durables, by the fraction of employed
members of the representative impatient household.
2.2.2 Savers
Patient households are nancially unconstrained and behave as standard life-cycle
consumption-smoothing agents. They own rms operating in the economy and they
own physical capital which is rented to the rms. Furthermore, they extend loans
to the borrowers and receive the proceedings from the production activity. Savers
preferences are dened over the deviation of their consumption of non-durables from
a stock of external habits (Cst   &Ct 1), and durable goods services (Dst ):
E0
1X
t=0
t [log (Cst   &Ct 1) +  logDst ] ;
where  (> ) is the discount factor and, for all t; Cst  0 and Dst  0. Utility
maximization is subject to the following budget constraint:
Cst +Qt
 
Dst  Dst 1

+Rt 1Bst 1 +K
s
t = B
s
t +K
s
t 1
 
Rkt   k

 
2

Kst
Kst 1
  1
2
Kst 1 + T
s
t ;
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where T st denotes a lump-sum component of income, which may account, among
other things, for rm prots, and 
2

Kst
Kst 1
  1
2
Kst 1 is a term representing the cost
of adjusting the capital stock.
2.2.3 Firms
The production side of the economy consists of rms operating in a perfectly compet-
itive market using labor and physical capital as an inputs, and bargaining over wages
and hours with their employees.
All such rms have access to a production function:
Yt = AtK
1 
t [NtLt]
 ;  > 0,
where At represents the state of technology, which is assumed to be common across
rms and to vary exogenously over time.
Employment evolves according to:
Nt = (1  )Nt 1 +Ht 1
where  is an exogenous separation rate and Ht represents the measure of workers
hired by each rm in period t.
In order to nd new workers, each rm has to post vacancies Vt which are assumed
to have a unit cost  in terms of the nal good.
2.2.4 Labor Market: Flows and Timing
We assume that at the beginning of each period there is a pool of jobless individuals
available for hire, whose size is U bt . The latter, divided by F
b
t ; denes the unemploy-
ment rate.
Among those unemployed at the beginning of period t, a measureHbt are hired and
start working in the following period. Thus, ex-post (i.e. after hiring takes place),
36
the fraction of impatient agents involuntarily unemployed is:
J bt = U
b
t  Hbt ;
and the following relationship must hold in every period:
N bt + J
b
t +H
b
t = F
b
t :
Hiring is generated by a constant returns to scale matching function with "e¤ec-
tive" job searchers etUt and job vacancies Vt as arguments:
Ht =   (etUt)
 V 1 t ;
where   is a scaling parameter representing the technological level of the job
creation process.
We introduce an index of labor market tightness, xt, dened as the ratio of e¤ective
job applicants to vacancies:
xt  etUt
Vt
:
The probability for a job applicant to be matched is:
pwt =
Ht
etUt
;
while the probability for a rm to ll a position is
pft =
Ht
Vt
:
37
2.3 Equilibrium
2.3.1 Savers
As to the savers, the relevant state variables at the beginning of each period are
Ks; Ds; Bs, 4 while the control variables are Cs; Ds0; Bs
0
; Ks0: The dynamic program
faced by impatient households is:
V (Ds; Bs; Ks) = max
Cs;Ds0;Bs0 ;Ks0
n
log (Cs   &C) +  logDs0 + E [V (Ds0; Bs0; Ks0)]
o
subject to
Cs +Q (Ds0  Ds) +RBs +Ks0 = Bs0 +Ks  Rk   k  
2

Ks0
Ks
  1
2
Ks + T
The rst order conditions of the program are:
1
Cs   &C = 
s;

Ds0
+ E

@V (Ds0; Bs0; Ks0)
@Ds0

= sQ;
 s = E

@V (Ds0; Bs0; Ks0)
@Bs0

;
s

1 + 

Ks0
Ks
  1

= E

@V (Ds0; Bs0; Ks0)
@Ks0

;
where s is the shadow value of an extra unit of income.
4For the sake of brevity we omit aggregate variables as well as exogenous shocks in the denition
of the state variables of the program.
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The envelope conditions read as:
@V (Ds; Bs; Ks)
@Ds
= sQ;
@V (Ds; Bs; Ks)
@Bs
=  sR;
@V (Ds; Bs; Ks)
@Ks
= s
"
Rk   k + 

Ks0
Ks
  1

Ks0
Ks
  
2

Ks0
Ks
  1
2#
:
Substituting the envelope conditions into the rst order conditions we obtain:
1 = E

s0
s
R0

(2.4)

1 + 

Ks0
Ks
  1

= E
24s0
s
0@ Rk0   k +   Ks00Ks0   1 Ks00Ks0
 
2
 
Ks00
Ks0   1
2
1A35 (2.5)
sQ =

Ds0
+ E
h
s
0
Q0
i
(2.6)
where (2.4), is the euler equation for Cs, (2.5) is a q-theoretic condition that
shows how the presence of quadratic costs of capital adjustment introduces, out of
the steady state, a wedge between the value of installed capital and the price of
investment goods, and (2.6) is the saversdemand for durable goods.
2.3.2 Labor Market Equilibrium
We assume that each rm negotiates every period with its employees over individual
compensation and hours worked, in accordance with a Nash bargaining protocol.
This implies that, at any point in time, the worker and the rm enjoy a constant
share of the total surplus deriving from an existing employment relationship. Moving
towards the Nash bargaining problem, it is convenient to formulate the optimization
problems faced by the representative impatient household and by the representative
rm in recursive form.
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Borrowers
As to the impatient households, the relevant state variables at the beginning of each
period are the debt level Bb, the stock of durable goods Db; and the fraction of em-
ployed members N b. The control variables are non-durable and durable consumption
Cb; Db
0
; new loans Bb
0
; the fraction of job seekers U b; and job search e¤ort e. The
dynamic program faced by impatient households is therefore:
V b
 
Bb; Db; N b

= max
Cb;Db
0 ;Bb0 ;Ub;e
8<: log
 
Cb   &C+  logDb0 + 1N b (1 L)1 '1 ' + 2U b (1 e)1 'e1 'e +
3
 
1 N b   U b (1 h)1 'e
1 'e + E

V b
 
Bb
0
; Db
0
; N b0

9=;
subject to:
Cb +Q
 
Db0  Db+RBb = Bb0 +W  N bL;
N b0 = (1  )N b + pweU b;
Bb0    N b E Q0
R0
Db0

:
Alternatively, the problem can be written as:
V b
 
Bb; Db; N b

= max
Cb;Db
0 ;Bb0 ;Ub;e
(
log
 
Cb   &C+  b logDb0 + 1N b (1  L)1 '
1  ' + 2U
b (1  e)1 'e
1  'e
+3
 
1 N b   U b (1  h)1 'e
1  'e
+ E
h
V b

Bb
0
; Db
0
; (1  )N b + pweU b
i)
subject to
Cb +Q
 
Db0  Db+RBb = Bb0 +WN bL; (2.7)
Bb0    N b E Q0
R0
Db0

: (2.8)
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The rst order conditions of the program are:
1
Cb   &C = 
b;
 b
Db0
+ 
 
N b

E

Q0
R0

+ E
"
@V b
 
Bb0; Db0; N b0

@Db0
#
= bQ; (2.9)
b   + E
"
@V b
 
Bb0; Db0; N b0

@Bb0
#
= 0; (2.10)
3
(1  h)1 'e
1  'e
  2 (1  e)
1 'e
1  'e
  pweE
"
@V b
 
Bb
0
; Db
0
; N b0

@N b0
#
= 0; (2.11)
2U
b (1  e) 'e   pwU bE
"
@V b
 
Bb
0
; Db
0
; N b0

@N b0
#
= 0; (2.12)
where b is the multiplier associated with (2.7) and  is the multiplier associated
with (2.8). Equation (??) is the participation condition which says that, in equilib-
rium, the marginal disutility of participating the labor market must be equal to the
expect discounted marginal benet of nding a job. Equation (2.12) says that the
optimal level of e¤ort is the one which equates its marginal disutility to its expected
discounted marginal benet.
The envelope conditions read as:
@V b
 
Bb; Db; N b

@Bb
=  bR; (2.13)
@V b
 
Bb; Db; N b

@Db
= bQ; (2.14)
@V b
 
Bb; Db; N b

@N b
= 1
(1  L)1 '
1  '   3
(1  h)1 'e
1  'e
+ bWL (2.15)
+
 
N b
 1
E

Q0
R0
Db0

+  (1  )E
"
@V b
 
Bb0; Db0; N b0

@N b0
#
:
Substituting (2.13) into (2.10) we obtain:
b = + E

b0R0

(2.16)
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which is the consumption euler equation for impatient households. It says that
in equilibrium the lifetime utility stemming from an extra unit of borrowing, equals
the marginal utility of today consumption minus the expected marginal disutility of
consuming less tomorrow.
Substituting (2.14) into (2.9) we obtain:
bQ =
 b
Db0
+ E

b0Q0

+ 
 
N b

E

Q0
R0

(2.17)
the impatientsdemand for durable goods.
Equation (2.15) should be expressed in nal good terms:
1
b
@V b
 
Bb; Db; N b

@N b
= 1
(1  L)1 '
1  '
1
b
  3 (1  h)
1 'e
1  'e
1
b
+WL+ 
 
N b
 1
E

Q0
R0
Db0

1
b
+ (1  )E
"
@V b
 
Bb0; Db0; N b0

@N b0
b0
b
#
1
b0
:
Finally, dene Sb  1
b
@V b(Bb;Db;Nb)
@Nb
the household surplus stemming from an existing
working relationship, so that:
Sb = WL 
 
3
(1  h)1 'e
1  'e
1
b
  1 (1  L)
1 '
1  '
1
b
!
+ (2.18)
+
 
N b
 1
E

Q0
R0
Db0

1
b
+  (1  )E

b0
b
Sb0

;
Equation (2.18) says that the household surplus from an existing working rela-
tionship is equal to di¤erence between labor income and the (relative) disutility from
working, plus the value stemming from the possibility to borrow, plus tomorrows
expected discounted surplus. Note that with  = 0 we would obtain a standard
labor-leisure trade-o¤ .
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The reservation wage for the borrowers is therefore the one that solves Sb = 0 or
W lowL =  1 (1  L)
1 '
1  '
1
b
+ 3
(1  h)1 'e
1  'e
1
b
    N b 1E Q0
R0
Db0

1
b
  (1  )E

b0
b
Sb0

;
and it is decreasing in the term reecting the value of employment for accessing
credit.
Firms
The program faced by rms is to chose the optimal number of vacancies and the
optimal amount of capital to maximize prots :
V f (N) = max
V K

AK1  (LN)  WLN    Rk   1K   V + E s0
s
V f (N 0)

;
subject to the law of motion for N
N 0 = (1  )N + pfV:
The rst order condition with respect to V reads as:
 = pfE

s0
s
@V f (N 0)
@N 0

;
and says that the marginal cost of posting a vacancy is equal to the expected
discounted marginal value of a worker.
Optimal demand for capital reads as:
(1  )AK  (LN) = Rk   1;
which equates the rental rate of capital to its marginal productivity.
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As to the envelope condition:
@V f (N)
@N
= AK1  (LN) 1 L WL+  (1  )E

s0
s
@V f (N 0)
@N 0

= AK1  (LN) 1 L WL+ (1  ) 
pf
:
The last condition says that the value to the rm stemming from an existing
working relationship is equal to the di¤erence between the marginal productivity of
a worker and his compensation, plus the "saving", in terms of vacancy costs, that a
lled position entails.
The prot maximization condition describing the equilibrium for vacancy posting
can therefore be rewritten as:

pf
= E

s0
s

A0K 01  (L0N 0) 1 L0  W 0L0 + (1  ) 
pf 0

; (2.19)
which tells us that the marginal cost of posting a vacancy, weighted by the duration
of an open vacancy, must be equal to its expected marginal benet.
Finally, we dene the rms surplus associated with an existing working relation-
ship as Sf  @V f (N)
@N
; thus obtaining:
Sf = AK1  (LN) 1 L WL+ (1  ) 
pf
:
Hence we can rewrite equation (2.19) in a more compact way as:

pf
= E

s0
s
Sf

(2.20)
The reservation wage for the rms is therefore the one that solves Sf = 0 or
W highL = AK1  (LN) 1 L+ (1  ) 
pf
:
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Nash Wage Bargaining
We assume that workers and rms determine wages and hours worked. under Nash
bargaining. This is equivalent to solve the following optimization problem:
max
Wt;Lt
 
!Sbt
1  
Sft

where  2 [0; 1] indexes the relative bargaining power of rms. The rst order condi-
tion with respect to Wt reads as:
(1  )  !Sbt    @Sbt@Wt!

Sft

+ 

Sft
 1 @Sft
@Wt
! 
!Sbt
1 
= 0;
or, equivalently,
Sbt = (1  )Sft :
After substituting for the values of Sb and Sf ; this implies:
WtLt =
 
3
(1  h)1 'e
1  'e
  1 (1  Lt)
1 '
1  '
!
1
bt
(2.21)
+
(1  )

 
Sft   (1  ) Et
"
bt+1
bt

Sft+1
#!
  t
 
N bt
 1
Et

Qt+1
Rt+1
Dbt+1
bt

:
Equation (2.21) is the key: the real wage is positively related to the terms reecting
the disutility from working and the householdsshare of surplus. Conversely, it is
negatively related to the term reecting the benet stemming from the ability to
borrow.
As to the rst order condition with respect to hours we obtain:
(1  )  !Sbt   @Sbt@Lt!

Sft

=  

Sft
 1 @Sft
@Lt
! 
!Sbt
1 
;
45
or, equivalently,
2AtK
1 
t 1 L
 1
t N
 1
t = 1 (1  Lt) '
1
bt
; (2.22)
which ties the marginal rate of substitution between non durable consumption
and workersleisure, to the marginal productivity of hours worked.
2.3.3 Market Clearing
The supply of durable goods is constant at D, so that for all t:
D = !Dbt + (1  !)Dst : (2.23)
Aggregate non-durable consumption is Ct = !Cbt + (1  !)Cst , while the aggregate
resource constraint is obtained as the weighted sum of the two budget constraints:
!
 
Cbt

+ (1  !) (Cst +Kst ) = !
 
Bbt +WtN
b
tLt

+(1  !)
 
Bst +K
s
t 1
 
Rkt   k
  
2

Kst
Kst 1
  1
2
Kst 1 + T
s
t
!
or
Yt = Ct +Kt  Kt 1
 
1  k+ Vt + 
2

Kt
Kt 1
  1
2
Kt 1;
Debt market equilibrium solves:
!Bbt + (1  !)Bst = 0; (2.24)
while aggregate transfers are:
Tt  (1  !)T st = AtK1 t 1 (LtNt)  WtLtNt  
 
Rkt   1

Kt 1   Vt:
As to the labor market, the following relationships hold:
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Nt = !N
b
t ;
Ht = !H
b
t ;
Ut = !U
b
t ;
Jt = !J
b
t :
2.3.4 Stochastic processes
The model is subject to three sources of uncertainty a¤ecting rmstechnology At,
householdstaste for durable goods  t and the loan to value ratio t:We assume that
each of those variables follow an AR(1) process:
logAt = 
A logAt 1 + "At "
A
t  N
 
0; 2a

(2.25)
log  t = (1   ) +  log  t 1 + "t "t  N
 
0; 2

(2.26)
logt = (1  )+  logt 1 + "t "t  N
 
0; 2

(2.27)
2.4 Solution and Calibration
To solve the model, we log-linearize the equations describing the equilibrium (refer
to Appendix C ) around the non-stochastic steady state.5 Steady state variables are
reported without time subscripts.
The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. The numerical value of certain
parameters is computed by calibrating the following steady-state variables: L; e; h;N; pf ;
pw; D; QD
Y
V
Y
. The following parameters are set in accordance with previous studies:
; ; k; '; ; ; ; ;
a; 2a; 
 ; 2 ; 
; 2.
5We assume that shocks that hit the economy are not big enough to lead to paths of the endoge-
nous variables distant from their steady state levels.
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2.4.1 Parameters
We assume the shares of impatient households ! to be 0:86: As to the discount factors,
we follow Iacoviello (2005) and set  = 0:95 and  = 0:99. The depreciation rate for
capital is set k = 0:025. We calibrate ' = 5; implying an individual Frisch elasticity
of labor supply equal to 0.4, which is consistent with the ndings of Domeij and
Floden (2006). In the baseline calibration the external habits parameter (&) is set
to 0. As to rmsproduction technology , we set  = 0:66 , while the parameters
capturing the persistence and variance of the productivity growth stochastic process
are a = 0:95 and a = 0:01, respectively. Bargain e¢ ciency requires  =  (Hosios
condition, Hosios (1990)). In the literature can be found values ranging from 0.4 to
0.6: similarly to Pescatori and Tasci (2011) we selected an halfway parametrization
of  = 0:5,  = 0:5. The parameter determining the exogenous exit from an existing
working relationship ; is set to 0:10 as in Monacelli et al. (2011).
2.4.2 Calibration
First we set the hours spent working L = 1=3, the steady state value for search e¤ort
to e = 0:9L and the amount of time spent in home production to h = 0:1e .We
calibrate N = 0:612 which is the mean of the employment/population ratio observed
in the data. Following Andolfatto (1996) we set pf = 0:9 , and the total vacancy
posting costs over GDP (V
Y
= kv) equal to 0:01; following Monacelli et al. (2011) we
calibrate pw = 0:93. This calibration delivers a value for the labor force F = 0:83
and an unemployment rate U
F
= 0:267. As to the parameters concerning housing, we
rst normalize D = 1; and, following Iacoviello (2005) we impose QD
Y
= kq = 1:4  4;
while we set the steady state value for the loan to value ratio to  = 0:7; as in Gerali
et al. (2010).
6Since economy-wide employment rate is Nt = !N bt , reasonable values for N
b
t impose a lower
bound on !:
7This is a large number compared to the data, but since pw = HeU < 1; assuming e < L = 1=3
requires a relatively large value for U:
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Given this calibration we obtain the implied values for  = 0:14 and for 1 = 0:36;
while 2 = 3 = 0:14, implying that employed members value leisure time more than
the unemployed.
Regarding the stochastic process for the demand shock we use the estimates of
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) assuming  = 0:96 and  = 0:0416, while following Liu
et al. (2011) we calibrate the parameters of the process for the nancial shock to
 = 0:98 and  = 0:01
Finally in the baseline calibration we set the parameter associated to the adjust-
ment costs for capital,  to 0:.
2.4.3 Steady state
Whether employment matters for credit or not has an e¤ect on the steady state. In
order to compare the model with  = 1 to that in which  = 0; we needed to take
a stand on this issue. On one hand we could calibrate the two models to match
the same steady state, and let the preference parameters adjust accordingly, or we
could do the opposite: x the preference parameters and start from di¤erent steady
states. It turns out that the dynamics around the steady state are not a¤ected by
the strategy adopted, hence, without loss of generality, for the purpose of this paper
we decided to follow the rst option. In Appendix D we describe the method used to
solve for the steady state.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Technology shock
In gure 431 we report impulse response functions, under the baseline calibration,
for a set of relevant variables following a technology shock and we compare the case
 = 0 (red,stars) to the case  = 1 (blue, circles). The purpose of this exercise, is
to evaluate the role played by employment status as a determinant for accessing the
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credit market in the transmission of the technology shock.
The substantial di¤erence between the two competing models is related to the
labor market variables. First, in the case where employment status is relevant for
accessing the credit market, both the intensive and the extensive margins (and search
e¤ort) are initially more strongly correlated with the technology shock. As a conse-
quence, this allows the borrowers to obtain more credit and to increase their durable
consumption. Second, and consistently with the data, the magnitude of the response
at the extensive margin is bigger than that at the intensive one. Third, at impact,
the response of the real wage is somewhat lower in the case  = 1: Fourth, vacancies
and hiring are more volatile (at least at impact). The increase in productivity, lead
a larger fraction of impatient household members to look for a job (and in a more
e¤ective way), when their job status a¤ects their possibility to obtain credit. The
value of credit, induces them to accept a lower wage as well, leading rms to increase
the number of posted vacancies and consequently of newly hired workers.
2.5.2 Demand shock
In this section we analyze the e¤ect of a shock to  ; which increases the demand
of durable goods for both household types. Signicant di¤erences between the two
competing models emerge from Figure 432
A positive shock to the demand for durable goods, drives up durable goods prices
(and the collateral value) increasing the borrowing capacity In the standard model
(red line) such a wealth e¤ect has a negative e¤ect on employment, hours worked and
search e¤ort. In our model, instead, an increase in the collateral value increases the
surplus of a working relationship, encouraging a larger fraction of household members
to look for a job and to reduce their reservation wage. A lower wage, increases the
rms surplus and their willingness to hire, as can be seen by the increase of vacancies
posted. In equilibrium, this leads to a sustained increase in employment and output,
causing a higher accumulation of debt and higher consumption of durable and non
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durable goods by the impatients.
2.5.3 Financial shock
Another source of disturbance that has been analyzed in the literature on credit mar-
ket frictions (e.g. Liu et al. (2011) ) is the one a¤ecting the loan to value ratio, which
can be interpreted as an innovation to the nancial structure of the economy. In prin-
ciple, one could expect that an unexpected increase in the fraction of collateralazible
assets, by increasing the borrowing capacity, would produce dynamics qualitatively
similar to those obtained after a demand shock. Figure 433 shows that this is not
the case.
In the model where employment status is irrelevant for obtaining credit (red line),
an increase in the loan to value produces a larger increase in debt, impatient house-
holdsdurable consumption and durable prices. This initial positive wealth e¤ect,
reduces signicantly the value of a job as indicated by the impatient householdssur-
plus, reducing the number of job applications, the e¤ort produced in the job search
and the hours worked. On the other hand, the wealth e¤ect increases the households
reservation wage. Hence the number of employed members initially decreases. As the
wealth e¤ect produced by the initial increase in durable prices disappears, the value
of a job increases, leading to an increase in the number of job applications and to a
reduction in the reservation wage, which result in to a reversal in the employment
rate.
When, instead, employment matters for credit applications, impatient household
members face a trade o¤, between taking advantage of "easier" credit and giving up
leisure time. Hence, the increase in debt, durable consumption and durable prices will
be lower, dampening the wealth e¤ect previously described and its consequences. In
other words, and di¤erently from the demand shock, the introduction of employment
as a requirement for credit, reduces the volatility of nancial variables following a
nancial innovation.
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Finally, note that the recent negative comovement between household debt and
labor variables that can observed in Figure (430), could be explained by a negative
nancial shock (i.e. a tightening of credit conditions).
2.5.4 The role of endogenous participation
In this section we want to explore the implications of endogenizing the labor par-
ticipation decisions. A detailed description of the solution and of the equilibrium
conditions for the model without endogenous participation can be found in Appendix
E.
For brevity, we will focus on the role played by endogenous participation in the
model in which employment matters for credit considerations8. Figure 434 displays
impulse response functions after a technology shock with (blue line) and without
(red line) endogenous participation. In a model without participation decision, the
number of job applicants is, at any point in time, residual to employment and inherits
its inertia driven by the parameter . Therefore, changes in hiring over time mimic
the evolution of vacancies ( and e¤ort in the job search) only. Hence, it is not
surprising that endogenizing the labor participation decision, results into a more
volatile response of the number of job applicants, which increases the fraction of
newly hired, increasing the employment rate for the rst few quarters. In other words,
by letting the impatient household members optimize over labor participation, the
response of the extensive margin is more volatile. After having observed an increase
in productivity, the number of job applicants will increase at impact (there is no
reason for waiting, since the probability of nding a job is given at individual level).
On the contrary, without labor participation, the pool of job applicants is given, and
the only choice variable at household level is the e¤ort in the job search, which, not
surprisingly, is more volatile.
8The same implications apply to the model with a specication of the borrowing constraint with
 = 0.
52
Finally, it is important to notice that while the model with participation decision
implies a counterfactual positive comovement between unemployment and vacancies,
the opposite holds true for the model without labor participation. On the other hand
this is a well established property of the RBC model with labor force participation
decision, as pointed out by Tripier (2004) and Veracierto (2008)Veracierto (2008),
among others, and therefore it is not specic to the model presented here.
The same intuition carries over from the inspection of the impulse response func-
tions following a demand and a nancial shock, which we display, for completeness,
in Figure 435 and 436, respectively.
2.5.5 Business cycles properties
On Table (3.3) we report standard deviations and correlations for the US, using data
collected from the FRED database. The sample ranges from the rst quarter of 1975
to the second quarter of 2011, except for vacancies, for which we have data starting
from 2000. All series have been logged and ltered with HP-Filter.
Tables (3.4) and (3.5) report the same descriptive second moments statistics ob-
tained through simulations of the model for the case  = 1 and  = 0, respectively.
Simulations have been computed over 10000 periods, discarding the rst 1000 obser-
vations, and account for the presence of all shocks.
What stands out is the capability of the model in which employment status is
relevant for accessing credit, to predict a positive correlation between debt and the
extensive margin of labor (0.78) which slightly exceeds the one observed in the data
(0.64). On the contrary the model with the conventional set-up for the borrowing
constraint, predicts a negative comovement between debt and all labor-related vari-
ables.
Both models, instead, are unable to predict the correct sign and magnitude of the
correlation between hours worked and outstanding debt. Two di¤erent extensions
of the model could be able to reconcile the models predictions with the empirical
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evidence. First, the introduction of a third category of working households not -
nancially constrained could reduce the substitution e¤ect between workers and hours
worked, second the inclusion of a second constraint for the borrowing households, ty-
ing debt repayment to a fraction of labor income, could provide a channel by which,
following an increase of durable goods prices, both the extensive and the intensive
margin increase.
Finally it is worth noticing that, conrming the analysis of the previous Section,
in the model with endogenous participation, and contrary to the data, there is a
positive comovement between vacancies and the unemployment rate. Nonetheless,
this counterfactual implication of the model seems to be even more signicant in the
model with  = 0 . Tables (3.6) and (3.7), report the business cycle implications for
the models without endogenous participation and show how the results concerning
the comovement between debt and labor variables are robust to the assumptions
concerning the labor participation decision.
2.6 Concluding remarks
The empirical evidence suggests that a successful model with labor and credit frictions
should predict a positive comovement between outstanding household debt and labor
market variables. In particular, the data show that the extensive margin of labor
supply, is the labor related variable which is most strongly correlated with debt.
We nd that a model that simply nests the features of standard search and match-
ing models with those of conventional models with credit frictions, is unable to account
for such comovement.
To circumvent this problem we propose a new way of modelling the agency problem
between debtors and creditors, by assuming, consistently with empirical ndings, that
employment status provides access to credit.
We nd that this feature alone, is able to reproduce the observed comovement
between employment, total hours and debt.
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We document that the model predictions are robust to alternative assumptions on
the labor force participating decision. The only aspect in which the model without
endogenous participation seems preferable, concerns the relationship between unem-
ployment and vacancies. If on one hand this feature is not specic to our model, on
the other hand it could be interesting to investigate whether the introduction of a
wedge between the search and matching mechanism concerning agents in the labor
force and that concerning agents out of the labor force, implying for the latter a
lower probability of being matched, could be able to reverse the relationship between
vacancies and unemployment.
On the negative side, we nd that neither our proposed model, nor the one with
a conventional borrowing constraint, are able to match the comovement between
hours per employee and debt. We suggest that extensions accounting for either the
presence of unconstrained workers, or imposing a constraint limiting debt repayments
to a fraction of labor income, could be able to improve the models performance on
this aspect.
We leave these questions for future research.
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Chapter 3
Tables
Parameter Value Description
 0.36 Capital share
 0.99 Patients discount factor
 0.95 Impatients discount factor
 2 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution
b 2 Inverse of interest elasticity of money demand)
 0.019 Depreciation rate of capital
 0.99 Relative share of consumption
 1.01 Steady state value of nominal growth rate
m 0.75 Autocorrelation of money growth process
m 0.09 Standard deviation of innovations to money growth process
Table 3.1: Calibrated parameters for complete markets model
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Percentage of nancial wealth
held by bottom
20% 40% 50% 80% 90% 99% Gini coe¤. % constr.
Data 0.003 0.065 0.2 2.8 9.5 57 0.78 20.5
Model (neutral transfers) 2.4 7 9.7 34.2 56.5 93 0.61 2.2
Model (lump sum transfers) 2.4 7.1 9.9 34.4 56.7 93 0.60 2.16
Percentage of liquid wealth
held by bottom
20% 40% 50% 80% 90% 99% Gini coe¤.
Data 0.03 0.35 0.74 5.9 18 66 0.73
Model (neutral transfers) 12.9 28 35.8 65.8 80.3 97.4 0.21
Model (lump sum transfers) 13.1 28.1 36 65.9 80.3 97.4 0.21
Percentage of non monetary wealth
held by bottom
20% 40% 50% 80% 90% 99% Gini coe¤.
Data 0.0008 0.04 0.14 2.6 8.8 56 0.79
Model (neutral transfers) 2.2 6.6 9.2 33.5 56 92.9 0.62
Model (lump sum transfers) 2.3 6.7 9.4 33.8 56.1 92.9 0.62
Table 3.2: Distribution of wealth and of its components: data and
models
Y Bb N L NL w V U
F

Y
1 1.58 0.67 0.29 1.29 0.36 10.81 7.45
Correlations Y Bb N L NL w V U
F
Y 1
Bb 0.51 1
N 0.86 0.64 1
L 0.74 0.17 0.61 1
NL 0.88 0.52 0.96 0.67 1
w 0.12 -0.10 0.02 -0.08 -0.15 1
V 0.88 0.50 0.66 -0.01 0.88 -0.76 1
U
F
-0.88 -0.54 -0.95 0.11 -0.88 0.06 -0.85 1
Table 3.3: Standard deviations and correlations:Data
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Y Bb N L NL w V U
F

Y
1 4.27 0.60 0.13 0.49 0.98 1.67 1.17
Correlations Y Bb N L NL w V U
F
Y 1
Bb 0.44 1
N 0.25 0.78 1
L -0.06 -0.90 -0.83 1
NL 0.29 0.70 0.99 -0.74 1
w 0.87 0.1 -0.25 0.31 -0.21 1
V 0.28 0.41 0.25 -0.23 0.24 0.13 1
U
F
-0.31 -0.07 -0.16 0.06 -0.17 -0.27 0.79 1
Table 3.4: Standard deviations and correlations for the model with
endogenous participation and in which employment status is relevant
for obtaining credit.
Y Bb N L NL w V U
F

Y
1 3.14 0.47 0.08 0.48 0.97 3.81 2.90
Correlations Y Bb N L NL w V U
F
Y 1
Bb 0.10 1
N 0.33 -0.15 1
L 0.02 -0.42 0.03 1
NL 0.33 -0.22 0.99 0.19 1
w 0.87 0.25 -0.15 -0.18 -0.17 1
V 0.04 -0.12 -0.33 0.90 -0.18 0.03 1
U
F
-0.21 -0.09 -0.48 0.83 -0.33 -0.15 0.96 1
Table 3.5: Standard deviations and correlations for the model with
endogenous participation and in which employment status is irrelevant
for obtaining credit.
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Y Bb N L NL w V U
F

Y
1 3.81 0.46 0.10 0.38 0.94 1.34 1.47
Correlations Y Bb N L NL w V U
F
Y 1
Bb 0.50 1
N 0.30 0.78 1
L -0.07 -0.87 -0.77 1
NL 0.34 0.70 0.99 -0.65 1
w 0.91 0.24 -0.10 0.19 -0.06 1
V 0.39 0.65 0.56 -0.43 0.55 0.15 1
U
F
-0.30 -0.78 -1 0.77 -0.98 0.10 -0.56 1
Table 3.6: Standard deviations and correlations for the model without
endogenous participation and in which employment status is relevant
for obtaining credit.
Y Bb N L NL w V U
F

Y
1 3.42 0.34 0.09 0.38 0.96 2.28 1.10
Correlations Y Bb N L NL w V U
F
Y 1
Bb 0.21 1
N 0.34 -0.05 1
L 0.07 -0.44 0.28 1
NL 0.33 -0.15 0.97 0.49 1
w 0.90 0.32 -0.05 -0.22 -0.10 1
V 0.20 -0.08 -0.08 0.85 0.13 0.07 1
U
F
-0.34 0.05 -1 -0.28 -0.97 0.05 0.08 1
Table 3.7: Standard deviations and correlations for the model without
endogenous participation and in which employment status is i relevant
for obtaining credit
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Figure 41: Unconstrained agent: intertemporal budget constraint
(dashed) and indi¤erence curves (solid). Left Panel: (c1;m1) space;
Right Panel: (c1; c2) space.  = 1:01; 1:03; 1:05; b =  = 0:5
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Figure 42: Unconstrained agent: intertemporal budget constraint
(dashed) and indi¤erence curves (solid). Left Panel: (c1;m1) space;
Right Panel: (c1; c2) space.  = 1:01; 1:03; 1:05; b =  = 1
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Figure 43: Unconstrained agent: intertemporal budget constraint
(dashed) and indi¤erence curves (solid). Left Panel: (c1;m1) space;
Right Panel: (c1; c2) space.  = 1:01; 1:03; 1:05; b =  = 2
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Figure 44: Constrained Agent: intertemporal budget constraint (
dashed with positive borrowing) and indi¤erence curves (solid). Left
Panel: (c1;m1) space; Right Panel: (c1; c2) space.  = 1:01; 1:03; 1:05;
b =  = 0:5
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Figure 45: Constrained Agent: intertemporal budget constraint
(dashed with positive borrowing) and indi¤erence curves (solid). Left
Panel: (c1;m1) space; Right Panel: (c1; c2) space.  = 1:01; 1:03; 1:05;
b =  = 1
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Figure 46: Constrained Agent: intertemporal budget constraint
(dashed with positive borrowing) and indi¤erence curves (solid). Left
Panel: (c1;m1) space; Right Panel: (c1; c2) space.  = 1:01; 1:03; 1:05;
b =  = 2
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Figure 47: Unconstrained agent. Upper left panel: c1 function of ;
Upper right panel:m1 function of  ; Lower left panel: c1m1 function of
; Lower right panel c2
c1
function of . Solid lines: b =  = 0:5, Dashed
lines: b =  = 1; Dotted lines: b =  = 2:
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Figure 48: Constrained agent. Upper left panel: c1 function of ;
Upper right panel:m1 function of  ; Lower left panel: c1m1 function of
; Lower right panel c2
c1
function of . Solid lines: b =  = 0:5, Dashed
lines: b =  = 1; Dotted lines: b =  = 2:
0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0
0
0 .2
0 .4
0 .6
0 .8
1
M o n e tary  Sho c k
0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0
-0 .5
-0 .4
-0 .3
-0 .2
-0 .1
0
0 .1
0 .2
Im p a ti en t' s  Co n s u m ptio n
0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
x  1 0
- 3 Patie n t' s  Co n s u m p ti on
0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0
-0 .0 0 5
0
0 .0 0 5
0 .0 1
0 .0 1 5
0 .0 2
0 .0 2 5
0 .0 3
Patie n t' s  Sa v in g s
0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
Im p a ti en t' s  M o n ey
0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
Patie n t' s  M on e y
0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0
0
0 .2
0 .4
0 .6
0 .8
1
1 .2
1 .4
Im p a ti en t' s  m o n ey  g ro wth
0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0
-0 .2
0
0 .2
0 .4
0 .6
0 .8
Patie n t' s  m on e y  g ro wth
0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
m /c  p a ti en ts
0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
m /c  im p atie n ts
0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
Agg re g a te  Re a l  M o n e y
0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0
0
0 .1
0 .2
0 .3
0 .4
0 .5
0 .6
0 .7
Agg re g a te  Re a l  M o n e y  g rowth
w=0.9 9
w=0.6 5
w=0.1
Figure 49: Impulse response functions (% deviation from steady
state) to a positive shock to the growth rate of nominal money sup-
ply for di¤erent values of ! and with (ex post) proportional seigniorage
transfers.
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Figure 410: Contemporaneous response of ination (% deviation
from steady state) to a positive shock to the growth rate of nominal
money supply for di¤erent values of ! and with (ex post) proportional
seigniorage transfers.
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Figure 411: Response of ination (% deviation from steady state)
from t + 1 onwards to a positive shock to the growth rate of nominal
money supply for di¤erent values of ! and with (ex post) proportional
seigniorage transfers.
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Figure 412: Impulse response functions (% deviation from steady
state) to a positive shock to the growth rate of nominal money supply
for di¤erent values of ! and with symmetric lump sum seigniorage
transfers.
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Figure 413: Contemporaneous response of ination (% deviation
from steady state) to a positive shock to the growth rate of nominal
money supply for di¤erent values of ! and with symmetric lump sum
seigniorage transfers.
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Figure 414: Response of ination (% deviation from steady state)
from t + 1 onwards to a positive shock to the growth rate of nominal
money supply for di¤erent values of ! and with symmetric lump sum
seigniorage transfers.
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Figure 415: Impulse response functions (% deviation from steady
state) to a positive one-time shock to the growth rate of nominal money
supply for di¤erent values of ! and with symmetric lump sum seignior-
age transfers.
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Figure 416: Contemporaneous response of ination (% deviation
from steady state) to a positive one-time shock to the growth rate
of nominal money supply for di¤erent values of ! and with symmetric
lump sum seigniorage transfers.
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Figure 417: Response of ination (% deviation from steady state)
from t + 1 onwards to a one-time positive shock to the growth rate
of nominal money supply for di¤erent values of ! and with symmetric
lump sum seigniorage transfers.
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Figure 418: Decision rules for m; k; c as function of individual wealth
calculated for the case in which K;M are at their average simulated
value: top row refer to l, bottom row to h. Transfers are ex-post
proportional to beginning of period holdings of real balnces.
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Figure 419: Simulation of aggregate capital conditional on e = el
(top row), e = em (second row),e = eh (third row), when transfers are
wealth neutral. On the fourth row are plotted the realizations for the
money growth process,.
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Figure 420: Simulation of aggregate real balances conditional on
e = el (top row), e = em (second row),e = eh (third row) with wealth
neutral transfers. On the fourth row are plotted the realizations for the
money growth process,.
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Figure 421: Simulation of aggregate consumption conditional on e =
el (top row), e = em (second row),e = eh (third row) with wealth
neutral transfers. On the fourth row are plotted the realizations for the
money growth process,.
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Figure 422: Simulation of economy-wide time series for capital (top
row) and real balances (second row) withwealth neutral transfers. On
the last row are plotted the realizations of the money growth process,
.
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Figure 423: Decision rules for m; k; c as function of individual wealth
calculated for the case in which K;M are at their average simulated
value: top row refer to l, bottom row to h, transfers are rebated as
lump sum.
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Figure 424: Ratios m=c and k=m at low wealth levels: top row l,
bottom row h:
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Figure 425: Simulation of aggregate capital conditional on e = el
(top row), e = em (second row),e = eh (third row), when transfers are
lump sum. On the fourth row are plotted the realizations for the money
growth process,.
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Figure 426: Simulation of aggregate real balances conditional on
e = el (top row), e = em (second row),e = eh (third row) with lump
sum transfers. On the fourth row are plotted the realizations for the
money growth process,.
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Figure 427: Simulation of aggregate consumption conditional on e =
el (top row), e = em (second row),e = eh (third row) with lump sum
transfers. On the fourth row are plotted the realizations for the money
growth process,.
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Figure 428: Simulation of economy-wide time series for capital (top
row) and real balances (second row) with lump sum transfers. On the
last row are plotted the realizations of the money growth process, .
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Figure 429: HP ltered real outstanding mortgage debt and total
hours worked. Shaded areas represent NBER recessions dates.
Figure 430: Top panel: HP ltered real outstanding mortgage debt
and employment rate. Bottom panel: HP ltered real outstanding
mortgage debt and average hours worked (per worker)..
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Figure 431: Impulse response functions after a technology shock un-
der the baseline calibration (% deviations from steady state). Solid line:
model in which employment status matters for obtaining credit; Dot-
ted line: model in which employment status is irrelevant for obtaining
credit.
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Figure 432: Impulse response functions after a demand shock for
durable goods under the baseline calibration (% deviations from steady
state). Solid line: model in which employment status matters for ob-
taining credit; Dotted line: model in which employment status is irrel-
evant for obtaining credit.
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Figure 433: Impulse response functions after a nancial shock under
the baseline calibration (% deviations from steady state). Solid line:
model in which employment status matters for obtaining credit; Dot-
ted line: model in which employment status is irrelevant for obtaining
credit.
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Figure 434: Impulse response functions after a technology shock un-
der the baseline calibration (% deviations from steady state). Solid
line: model with endogenous labor market participation; Dotted line:
model in which labor market participation is residual.
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Figure 435: Impulse response functions after a demand shock under
the baseline calibration (% deviations from steady state). Solid line:
model with endogenous labor market participation; Dotted line: model
in which labor market participation is residual.
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Figure 436: Impulse response functions after a nancial shock under
the baseline calibration (% deviations from steady state). Solid line:
model with endogenous labor market participation; Dotted line: model
in which labor market participation is residual.
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Appendix A
Non-stochastic steady state for the two
agents model
The equilibrium relationships describing the non-stochastic steady state of the model
described in section 1.3 under the assumption of lump sum transfer are the following:
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Under the assumption of ex-post proportional transfer the steady state solution
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is instead:
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Appendix B
Details on the solution algorithm for the
incomplete markets model
This Appendix is meant to complement section 1.4.3, by providing full details on
the solution algorithm employed for the incomplete market model. The algorithm
consists of an outer loop constructed to achieve convergence on the parameters of the
laws of motion, and an inner loop for the solution of the Bellman equation. The two
loops are linked by the fact that the solution of the Bellman equation (i.e. the optimal
decision rules) is used to simulate the economy and obtain a time-series for aggregate
capital and real balances through which the parameter convergence is tested.
B.1 Preliminary setup
1. Calculate a transition matrix P consistent with the stochastic processes for
e; ; z. Assuming uncorrelated shocks, P is the result of the Kronecker products
of the transition matrices associated to each source of uncertainty, and its size
is (nenzn  nenzn), with ne; nz and n being the size of the discrete support
for each shock with ne = 3; nz = n = 2.
2. Select grids for a;  ;K;M : the grid for a has more points near the lower bound
to allow for a more accurate solution in the region where the value function has
more curvature; the grids for  ;K;M are uniformly spaced. The sizes of these
grids are na; n ; nK ; and nM ; respectively.
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B.2 Initialization of the outer loop
1. Guess parameters of the laws of motion Ak; Bk; Ck; Am; Bm; Cm:
B.3 Initialization of the inner loop
Note that the right hand side of 1.36, which I rewrite for convenience below,
V (a;  ; e;K;M; z; ) = max
m0;k0
fU (c;m0) + E [V (a0;  0; e0;K 0;M0; z0; 0)je; z; ]g
requires the computation of the following objects: a0;  0; K 0 andM0: Tomorrows
individual wealth, a0 is equal to (1 + r0 (K 0; l; z0)   )k0 + m0
0(M00;M0;0) ; hence it is
function of K 0 through r () ; and of M0 and M00 through 0 () ; together with the
choice variables m0; k0. Tomorrows transfers,  0; are perceived as lump sum and
equal to (
0 1)M0
0(M00;M0;0) ; meaning that they are also function of M0 and M00. Overall,
this implies that in order to solve the problem we need to compute K 0;M0 andM00 as
a function of current aggregate states and possibly of next periods aggregate shocks.
This is done using the aggregate laws of motion (ALM) in the following way.
1. K 0 (K;M; z; ) andM0 (K;M; z; ) are computed from the ALMs as in (1.40)
and (1.41)
2. To calculateM00 (K;M; z; ; z0; 0) I iterate forward (1.41) to obtain:
logM00 (K;M; z; ; z0; 0) = Am (z0; 0) +Bm (z0; 0) logK 0 (K;M; z; ) +
+Cm (z
0; 0) logM0 (K;M; z; )
3. Calculate from previous steps r0 (K 0 (K;M; z; ) ; l; z0) with (1.19) and
0 (K;M; z; ; z0; 0) = 
0
M 00 (K;M; z; ; z0; 0)M
0 (K;M; z; )
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iterating (1.22) one period forward.
4. Calculate from previous steps  0 (K;M; z; ; z0; 0) = (0 1)M0(K;M;z;)
0(K;M;z;;z0;0)
B.4 Inner loop: value function iteration
1. Guess an initial value for V = V n(a;  ; e;K;M; z; ):
2. For each state realization a;  ; e;K;M; z; , solve:
max
m0;k0
(
u (a+ w (K; l; z) le+    k0  m0;m0) + 
nX
i=1
nzX
q=1
neX
j=1
prob
 
e0j; z
0
q; 
0
ije; z; 

"
V n
 
(1 + r0
 
K 0 (K;M; z; ) ; l; z0q
  )k0 + m0
0
 
K;M; z; ; z0q; 0i
 ;  0 (K;M; z; ; z0; 0) ;
e0j;K
0 (K;M; z; ) ;M 0 (K;M; z; ) ; z0q; 0i)
	
:
Note that in order to evaluate:
V n
 
(1 + r0
 
K 0 (K;M; z; ) ; l; z0q
  )k0 + m0
0
 
K;M; z; ; z0q; 0i
 ;  0 (K;M; z; ; z0; 0) ;
e0j;K
0 (K;M; z; ) ;M 0 (K;M; z; ) ; z0q; 0i);
I need to interpolate V n in the a;  ;K;M directions at points (1+r0
 
K 0 (K;M; z; ) ; l; z0q
 
)k0 + m
0
0(K;M;z;;z0q ;0i)
;  0 (K;M; z; ; z0; 0) ; K 0 (K;M; z; ) and M 0 (K;M; z; ) ;
respectively. To do so I use cubic spline interpolation when the point is within
the grid, and linear extrapolation for points outside the grid. As a result of
this step which is performed with sequential quadratic programming (SQP), I
obtain V n+1(a;  ; e;K;M; z; ) and policy functions m0 = fnm(a;  ; e;K;M; z; )
and k0 = fnk (a;  ; e;K;M; z; ).
3. If V n+1 su¢ ciently close to V n; obtain m0 = fm(a;  ; e;K;M; z; ) and k0 =
fk(a;  ; e;K;M; z; ); otherwise set V n = V n+1 and go back to 1.
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B.5 Continuation of outer loop: simulation stage
This is an extension of the method suggested by Young (2010) and reported in ?,
for obtaining simulations over a continuum of agents, as opposed to standard Monte
Carlo methods that introduce sampling noise. The extension deals with the fact that
in this model the endogenous cross sectional distribution over wealth and individual
productivities is a function of , which is determined by the market clearing condition
of the money market1.
1. Simulate a sequence for fzt; tgTt=1 using Pz and P, the Markovian matrices for
the aggregate shocks.
2. Given the transition matrix for the idiosyncratic shock, Pe, calculate the vector
of stationary probabilities e:
3. Select a ne grid for a with size I and call it G
4. Select starting values for K1;M1; K2;M2; ;2;  2 and for the density function
over wealth and idiosyncratic productivity P3 (G; e) such that pe;i;3 is the mass
of agents who had productivity e in t = 2 and wealth G(i) entering period 3.
5. For t = 3; ::T rst solve for t that guarantees market clearing as follows:
(a) Recall that at is a function of t and it is generated by the decisions for k
and m taken in t  1, more formally:
at (

t ) = fk(G;  t 1; e;Kt 2;Mt 2; zt 1; t 1) (1  rt   ) +
fm(G;  t 1; e;Kt 2;Mt 2; zt 1; t 1)
t
(b) Since at might imply values between two consecutive gridpoints, i  1 and
i of G, we can redistribute the probability mass of these values on the
1The idea is that period t wealth distribution is generated by period t  1 optimal decisions for k
and m, but it is allowed to vary depending on the values of  and L that achieve market clearing.
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surrounding gridpoints using the weights:
e;i;t (

t ) =
at (

t ) Gi 1
Gi  Gi 1
e;i 1;t (t ) = 1  e;i;t (t )
(c) Applying (b) for all I values of at I can update the density function over
wealth and last periods productivity status as follows:
Ft (G; e;

t ) =
X
i
e;i;t (

t ) pe;i;t
(d) Note that todays unconditional distribution of wealth for those with e = e1
today is equal to:
Pt (G; e1;

t ) = Ft (G; e1;

t )Pe(e = e1je = e1)+
Ft (G; e2;

t )Pe(e = e1je = e2)
e(e = e2)
e (e = e1)
+
Ft (G; e3;

t )Pe(e = e1je = e3)
e(e = e3)
e (e = e1)
and similarly
Pt (G; e2;

t ) = Ft (G; e1;

t )Pe(e = e2je = e1)
e(e = e1)
e (e = e2)
+
Ft (G; e2;

t )Pe(e = e2je = e2)+
Ft (G; e3;

t )Pe(e = e2je = e3)
e(e = e3)
e (e = e2)
Pt (G; e3;

t ) = Ft (G; e1;

t )Pe(e = e3je = e1)
e(e = e1)
e (e = e3)
+
Ft (G; e2;

t )Pe(e = e3je = e2)
e(e = e2)
e (e = e3)
+
Ft (G; e3;

t )Pe(e = e3je = e3)
(e) Period t decision for real balances are derived from fm(G;  t; e;Kt 1;Mt 1; zt; t)
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where  t can be calculated as
 t (

t ) =
(t   1)Mt 1
t
or
 t (G;

t ) =
(t   1)
t
fm(G;  t 1; e;Kt 2;Mt 2; zt 1; t 1)
depending on whether the transfer policy is symmetric or ex-post propor-
tional to individual money holdings.
(f) Aggregate money demand can be calculated as:
Mdt (t ) = e(e = e1)
X
i
Pt (Gi; e1;

t ) fm(Gi;  t (

t ) ; e1;Kt 1;Mt 1; zt; t)+
e(e = e2)
X
i
Pt (Gi; e2;

t ) fm(Gi;  t (

t ) ; e2;Kt 1;Mt 1; zt; t)+
e(e = e3)
X
i
Pt (Gi; e3;

t ) fm(Gi;  t (

t ) ; e3;Kt 1;Mt 1; zt; t)
or as
Mdt (t ) = e(e = e1)
X
i
Pt (Gi; e1;

t ) fm(Gi;  t (Gi;

t ) ; e1;Kt 1;Mt 1; zt; t)+
e(e = e2)
X
i
Pt (Gi; e2;

t ) fm(Gi;  t (Gi;

t ) ; e2;Kt 1;Mt 1; zt; t)+
e(e = e3)
X
i
Pt (Gi; e3;

t ) fm(Gi;  t (Gi;

t ) ; e3;Kt 1;Mt 1; zt; t)
again depending on the assumed transfer policy.
(g) Aggregate money supply can be computed simply as:
Mst (t ) =
t
t
Mt 1:
(h) Market clearing requiresMdt (t ) =Mst (t )
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6. Then given t = t I can calculate aggregate capital by either:
Kt = e(e = e1)
X
i
Pt (Gi; e1;t) fk(Gi;  t (t) ; e1;Kt 1;Mt 1; zt; t)+
e(e = e2)
X
i
Pt (Gi; e2;t) fk(Gi;  t (t) ; e2;Kt 1;Mt 1; zt; t)+
e(e = e3)
X
i
Pt (Gi; e3;t) fm(Gi;  t (t) ; e3;Kt 1;Mt 1; zt; t)
or
Kt = e(e = e1)
X
i
Pt (Gi; e1;t) fk(Gi;  t (Gi;t) ; e1;Kt 1;Mt 1; zt; t)+
e(e = e2)
X
i
Pt (Gi; e2;t) fk(Gi;  t (Gi;t) ; e2;Kt 1;Mt 1; zt; t)+
e(e = e3)
X
i
Pt (Gi; e3;t) fk(Gi;  t (Gi;t) ; e3;Kt 1;Mt 1; zt; t)
depending on the assumed transfer policy.
B.6 End of the outer loop
1. Given su¢ ciently long time series for Kt and Mt, run regressions on (1.40),
(1.41) to obtain estimates for A^k; B^k; C^k; A^m; B^m; C^m; and compute accuracy
statistics as shown in ?.
2. If the parameters estimates are su¢ ciently close to the guessed counterparts
and if accuracy is satisfactory stop, otherwise update parameters as follows:
X = X^ + (1  )X
where X = [Ak Bk Ck Am Bm Cm]
0 and X^ =
h
A^k B^k C^k A^m B^m C^m
i0
, and 
small and go back to section B.3 .
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Appendix C
Variables and Equilibrium Conditions
The model economy features 44 unknowns:8<: Cbt ; Cst ; Ct; Dbt ; Dst ; Bbt ; Bst ; N bt ; U bt ; Hbt ; F bt ; J bt ; Nt; Ut; Ht; Ft; Jt; xt; pwt ; p
f
t ; Vt; T
s
t ;Wt; Qt; Rt; 
b
t ;
P It
Pt
; Tt; Lt; yt; R
k; Kst ; Kt; et; 
b
t ; 
s
t ;MPKt;MPNt;MPNLt; S
b
t ; S
f
t ; At;  t; t
9=;
As to the equations that solve for the equilibrium:
 The budget constraint of the borrowers:
Cbt +Qt
 
Dbt  Dbt 1

+Rt 1Bbt 1 = B
b
t +WtN
b
tLt; (C.1)
 The borrowing constraint:
Bbt =
 
N bt

Et

Qt+1
Rt
Dbt

(C.2)
 BorrowersLagrange multiplier
bt =
1
Cbt   &Ct 1
(C.3)
 Borrowerseuler equation for non-durable consumption:
bt = Et

bt+1Rt
	
+ bt (C.4)
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 Borrowerseuler equation for durable consumption:
btQt =
 b
Dbt
+ Et

bt+1Qt+1
	
+ bt
 
N bt

Et

Qt+1
Rt

(C.5)
 Saversbudget constraint:
Cst+Qt
 
Dst  Dst 1

+Kst+Rt 1B
s
t 1 =
 
Rkt   k

Kst 1+B
s
t 

2

Kst
Kst 1
  1
2
Kst 1+T
s
t
(C.6)
 SaversLagrange multiplier
st =
1
Cst   &Ct 1
(C.7)
 Saverseuler equation for non-durable consumption:
st = Et

st+1Rt
	
(C.8)
 Savers euler equation for capital

1 + 

Kst
Kst 1
  1

= E
"
st+1
st
 
Rkt+1   k + 

Kst+1
Kst
  1

Kst+1
Kst
  
2

Kst+1
Kst
  1
2!#
(C.9)
 Saverseuler equation for durable consumption:
stQt =
 s
Dst
+ Et

st+1Qt+1
	
(C.10)
 Hiring equation:
Hbt 1 = N
b
t   (1  )N bt 1 (C.11)
 Labor force
N bt + J
b
t +H
b
t = F
b
t (C.12)
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 Tightness:
xt =
etUt
Vt
(C.13)
 Matching function
Ht =   (etUt)
 V 1 t (C.14)
 Probability of nding a job
pwt =
Ht
etUt
(C.15)
 Probability of lling a vacancy
pft =
Ht
Vt
(C.16)
 Ex-post (involuntary) unemployment:
J bt = U
b
t  Hbt (C.17)
 Total employment:
Nt = !N
b
t (C.18)
 Total hiring:
Ht = !H
b
t (C.19)
 Total labor force:
Ft = !F
b
t (C.20)
 Total involuntary unemployment:
Jt = !J
b
t (C.21)
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 Total ex-ante unemployment.
Ut = !U
b
t (C.22)
 Marginal product of a worker
MPNt = 
"  1
"
AtK
1 
t 1 [LtNt]
 1 Lt (C.23)
 Firmssurplus
Sft =MPNt  WtLt + (1  )

pft
(C.24)
 Borrowerssurplus
Sbt =
1  

Sft (C.25)
 The prot maximization condition for the intermediate good sector V :

pft
= E

st+1
st

Sft+1

(C.26)
 Marginal product of capital
MPKt = (1  ) P
I
t
Pt
AtK
 
t 1 [LtNt]
 (C.27)
 The prot maximization condition for the intermediate good sector K
MPKt = R
k
t   1 (C.28)
 The pricing equation for the nal good sector:
P It
Pt
=
"  1
"
(C.29)
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 The prot equation:
Tt = Yt  WtLtNt  
 
Rkt   1

Kt 1   Vt (C.30)
 Wage setting:
WtLt =
 
3
(1  h)1 'e
1  'e
  1 (1  Lt)
1 '
1  '
!
1
bt
+
(1  )

"
Sft   (1  ) E
(
bt+1
bt

Sft+1
)#
 t
 
N bt
 1
Et

1
bt
Qt+1
Rt
Dbt

;
or
WtLt =
 
3
(1  h)1 'e
1  'e
  1 (1  Lt)
1 '
1  '
!
1
bt
(C.31)
+
"
Sbt   (1  ) E
(
bt+1
bt
 
Sbt+1
)#  t  N bt  1Et 1
bt
Qt+1
Rt
Dbt

;
 Marginal product of hours per marginal worker
MPNLt = 
2 "  1
"
AtK
1 
t 1 L
 1
t N
 1
t (C.32)
 Equilibrium hours:
MPNLt = 1 (1  Lt) ' 1
bt
(C.33)
 Participation constraint
 
3
(1  h)1 'e
1  'e
  2 (1  et)
1 'e
1  'e
!
1
bt
= pwt et
(1  )

E
(
bt+1
bt
Sft+1
)
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or  
3
(1  h)1 'e
1  'e
  2 (1  et)
1 'e
1  'e
!
1
bt
= pwt etE
(
bt+1
bt
Sbt+1
)
(C.34)
 E¤ort decision
2 (1  et) 'e 1
bt
= pwt E

Sbt+1
	
(C.35)
 Market clearing for credit:
!Bbt + (1  !)Bst = 0 (C.36)
 Market clearing for durables:
!Dbt + (1  !)Dst = D (C.37)
 Aggregate consumption
!Cbt + (1  !)Cst = Ct (C.38)
 Aggregate capital
Kt = (1  !)Kst (C.39)
 Saversprots:
T st =
Tt
1  ! (C.40)
 Output:
Yt = AtK
1 
t 1 (NtLt)
 (C.41)
 Technology:
logAt = 
A logAt 1 + "At (C.42)
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 Durables demand shock
log  t = (1   ) +  log  t 1 + "t (C.43)
 Financial shock
logt = (1  )+  logt 1 + "t (C.44)
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Appendix D
Steady state solution
Given the parametersvalues reported in the paper, we calculate the steady state as
follow.
First, from the labor market identities we nd:
H = N
Hb =
H
!
J = F  H  N
U = J +H
V =
H
pf
x =
U
V
pw =
H
eU
From the saverseuler equation for non durable consumption we obtain the risk-
free interest rate:
R =  1
From the saverseuler equation for capital, we pin down the gross return from
capital:
Rk =  1 + k
From the rmsrst order condition with respect to K we calculate the marginal
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product of capital
MPK = Rk   1
From the denition of marginal product of capital we obtain the steady state value
for K :
K =

(1  ) " 1
"
MPK
 1

LN
From the production function and the calibrated parameters kq and kv we obtain
Y = AK1  (NL)
Q = kq
Y
D
 = kv
Y
V
From the denition of marginal product of a worker
MPN = 
"  1
"
AK1  [LN ] 1 L
From the rmsrst order conditions with respect to V we nd the steady state
value for rmssurplus:
Sf =

pf
From denition of rmssurplus we can compute the steady state real wage:
W =
MPN + (1  ) 
pf
  Sf
L
Steady state transfers are therefore:
T = (LN)  WLN   V
T s =
T
1  !
103
The value for   is backed out from the matching function
  =
H
(eU) V 1 
Using the borrowersdemand for durable consumption and the euler equation for
consumption ( and substituting )
bQ =
 b
Db
+ bQ+ b
 
N b
 Q
R
b = bR + b (D.1)
we obtain:
bQ

1     (1  R)
R

 
N b

=

Db
(D.2)
Using the borrowersbudget constraint and borrowing constraint
Cb + (R  1)Bb = WN bL
Bb =
 
N b


Q
R
Db (D.3)
we obtain:
Cb + (R  1)  N b Q
R
Db = WN bL (D.4)
Using the saversbudget constraint and the market clearing for B
Cs +Ks + (R  1)Bs =  Rk   kKs + T s
Bs =   !
(1  !)B
b (D.5)
we obtain:
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Cs   (R  1) !
(1  !)B
b =
 
Rk   k   1

Ks + T s
Substituting in the last equation for Bb from (D.3) we nd
Cs   (R  1) !
(1  !)
 
N b


Q
R
Db =
 
Rk   k   1

Ks + T s (D.6)
From the saversdemand for durable consumption and the market clearing for D
sQ (1  ) = 
Ds
Ds =
D   !Db
(1  !) (D.7)
we obtain:
sQ (1  ) =  (1  !)D   !Db (D.8)
Equations (D.2) (D.4) (D.6) (D.8) together with the denitions for b; s and C
b =
1
Cb   &C
s =
1
Cs   &C
C = !Cb + (1  !)Cs
constitute a system of 7 equations in 7 unknowns C;Cb; Cs; Db; b; s;  which we
solve for convenience numerically.
Given the solution of the above system we can recover Ds from (D.7), Bb from
(D.3), Bs from (D.5) and  from (D.1).
From the hours equation we can recover 1 :
1 = 
b MPNL
(1  L) '
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Finally from the system containing the wage equation, the e¤ort equation and the
participation constraint
WL =
 
3
(1  h)1 'e
1  'e
  1 (1  L)
1 '
1  '
!
1
b
+
(1  )


Sf (1  (1  ) )
   N b 1 1
b
Q
R
Db

;
 
3
(1  h)1 'e
1  'e
  2 (1  e)
1 '
1  '
!
1
b
= pwe
(1  )

Sf
2 (1  e) 'e 1
b
= pwt
(1  )

Sf
we can recover 3; 2 and 'e .
106
Appendix E
The model without labor participation
decision
The only di¤erences that emerge with respect to the model presented in the main
body of the paper a¤ect the problem of the borrowers.
E.1 Borrowers
The representative impatient household maximizes the present discounted value of
their expected utility:
E0
1X
t=0
t
"
log
 
Cbt   &Ct 1

+  b logDbt + 1N
b
t
(1  Lt)1 '
1  ' + 2U
b
t
(1  et)1 'e
1  'e
#
;
(E.1)
where all the variables and parameters have the same meaning as before.
Removing labor market participation decision, implies that at all times whoever
is unemployed is actively looking for a job. In other words now F bt  1.
The relevant state variables at the beginning of each period are Bb, Db; and
the fraction of employed members N b.1 The control variables are Cb; Db
0
; Bb
0
; e The
1For the sake of brevity we omit aggregate variables as well as exogenous shocks in the denition
of the state variables of the program.
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dynamic program faced by impatient households is:
V b
 
Bb; Db; N b

= max
Cb;Db0 ;Bb0 ;e
8<: log
 
Cb   &C+  b logDb0 + 1N b (1 L)1 '1 ' + 2  1 N b (1 e)1 'e1 'e +
+E

V b
 
Bb
0
; Db
0
; N b0

9=;
subject to
Cb +Q
 
Db0  Db+RBb = Bb0 +W  N bL;
N b0 = (1  )N b + pwe  1 N b ;
Bb0    N b E Q0
R0
Db0

:
Alternatively, the problem can be written as
V b
 
Bb; Db; N b

= max
Cb;Db
0 ;Bb0 ;e
8<: log
 
Cb   &C+  b logDb0 + 1N b (1 L)1 '1 ' + 2  1 N b (1 e)1 'e1 'e +
+E

V b
 
Bb
0
; Db
0
; (1  )N b + pwe  1 N b
9=;
subject to
Cb +Q
 
Db0  Db+RBb = Bb0 +WN bL;
Bb0    N b E Q0
R0
Db0

:
The FOCs of the program are.
1
Cb   &C = 
b;
 b
Db0
+ 
 
N b

E

Q0
R0

+ E
"
@V b
 
Bb0; Db0; N b0

@Db0
#
= bQ;
b   + E
"
@V b
 
Bb0; Db0; N b0

@Bb0
#
= 0;
2
 
1 N b (1  e) 'e = pw  1 N bE "@V b  Bb0 ; Db0 ; N b0
@N b0
#
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The envelope conditions read as:
@V b
 
Bb; Db; N b

@Bb
=  bR;
@V b
 
Bb; Db; N b

@Db
= bQ;
@V b
 
Bb; Db; N b

@N b
= 1
(1  L)1 '
1  '   2
(1  e)1 'e
1  'e
+ bWL+ 
 
N b
 1
E

Q0
R0
Db0

+ (1     pwe)E
"
@V b
 
Bb0; Db0; N b0

@N b0
#
:
The last envelope condition should be expressed in nal good terms:
1
b
@V b
 
Bb; Db; N b

@N b
= 1
(1  L)1 '
1  '
1
b
  2 (1  e)
1 'e
1  'e
1
b
+WL+ 
 
N b
 1
E

Q0
R0
Db0

1
b
+ (1     pwe)E
"
@V b
 
Bb0; Db0; N b0

@N b0
b0
b
#
1
b0
:
Finally, dene Sb  1
b
@V b(Bb;Db;Nb)
@Nb
the surplus from an existing working relationship
to the household, so that:
Sb = WL 
 
2
(1  e)1 'e
1  'e
1
b
  1 (1  L)
1 '
1  '
1
b
!
+ 
 
N b
 1
E

Q0
R0
Db0

1
b
(E.2)
+ (1     pwe)E

b0
b
Sb0

;
Equation (E.2) says that the surplus from an existing working relationship is equal
to di¤erence between labor income and the (relative) disutility from working plus the
value stemming from the possibility to borrow plus tomorrows expected discounted
surplus. Note that with  = 0 we would obtain a standard labor-leisure trade-o¤ .
The reservation wage for the borrowers is therefore the one that solves Sb = 0 or
W lowL =  1 (1  L)
1 '
1  '
1
b
+ 2
(1  e)1 'e
1  'e
1
b
    N b 1E Q0
R0
Db0

1
b
  (1     pwe)E

b0
b
Sb0

;
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E.2 Nash Wage Bargaining
We assume that workers and rms act in a way consistent with their optimizing con-
ditions. Under Nash bargaining we need to solve the following optimization problem:
max
Wt;Lt
 
!Sbt
1  
Sft

where  2 [0; 1] indexes the relative bargaining power of rms. The FOC with respect
to Wt reads as:
(1  )  !Sbt    @Sbt@Wt!

Sft

+ 

Sft
 1 @Sft
@Wt
! 
!Sbt
1 
= 0
or
Sbt = (1  )Sft
After substituting for the values of Sb and Sf ; this implies:
WtLt =
 
 1 (1  Lt)
1 '
1  ' + 2
(1  e)1 'e
1  'e
!
1
bt
+ (E.3)
(1  )

"
Sft   (1     pwt et) E
(
bt+1
bt

Sft+1
)#
  t
 
N bt
 1
Et

Qt+1
Rt+1
Dbt+1
bt

;
Equation (E.3) is di¤erent from (2.21) in two ways: the rst term measures the
relative disutilty of working in terms of the leisure time enjoyed by those who are
looking for a job, instead of the leisure time enjoyed by those who decided to not
participate to the labor market; second, the term discounting tomorrows surplus,
internalize the fact that a fraction pwt et of today job applicants will start working
tomorrow.
As to the FOC with respect to hours:
(1  )  !Sbt   @Sbt@Lt!

Sft

=  

Sft
 1 @Sft
@Lt
! 
!Sbt
1 
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or
2
"  1
"
AtK
1 
t 1 L
 1
t N
 1
t = 1 (1  Lt) '
1
bt
:
E.3 Equilibrium conditions
The model economy features 42 unknowns:8>>><>>>:
Cbt ; C
s
t ; Ct; D
b
t ; D
s
t ; B
b
t ; B
s
t ; N
b
t ; U
b
t ; H
b
t ; J
b
t ; Nt; Ut; Ht;
Jt; xt; p
w
t ; p
f
t ; Vt; T
s
t ;Wt; Qt; Rt; 
b
t ;
P It
Pt
; Tt; Lt;
yt; R
k; Kst ; Kt; et; 
b
t ; 
s
t ;MPKt;MPNt;MPNLt; S
b
t ; S
f
t ; At;  t; t
9>>>=>>>;
As to the equations that solve for the equilibrium:
 The budget constraint of the borrowers:
Cbt +Qt
 
Dbt  Dbt 1

+Rt 1Bbt 1 = B
b
t +WtN
b
tLt; (E.4)
 The borrowing constraint:
Bbt =
 
N bt

Et

Qt+1
Rt
Dbt

(E.5)
 BorrowersLagrange multiplier
bt =
1
Cbt   &Ct 1
(E.6)
 Borrowerseuler equation for non-durable consumption:
bt = Et

bt+1Rt
	
+ bt (E.7)
 Borrowerseuler equation for durable consumption:
btQt =
 b
Dbt
+ Et

bt+1Qt+1
	
+ bt
 
N bt

Et

Qt+1
Rt

(E.8)
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 Saversbudget constraint:
Cst+Qt
 
Dst  Dst 1

+Kst+Rt 1B
s
t 1 =
 
Rkt   k

Kst 1+B
s
t 

2

Kst
Kst 1
  1
2
Kst 1+T
s
t
(E.9)
 SaversLagrange multiplier
st =
1
Cst   &Ct 1
(E.10)
 Saverseuler equation for non-durable consumption:
st = Et

st+1Rt
	
(E.11)
 Savers euler equation for capital

1 + 

Kst
Kst 1
  1

= E
"
st+1
st
 
Rkt+1   k + 

Kst+1
Kst
  1

Kst+1
Kst
  
2

Kst+1
Kst
  1
2!#
(E.12)
 Saverseuler equation for durable consumption:
stQt =
 s
Dst
+ Et

st+1Qt+1
	
(E.13)
 Hiring equation:
Hbt 1 = N
b
t   (1  )N bt 1 (E.14)
 Labor force
N bt + J
b
t +H
b
t = 1 (E.15)
 Tightness:
xt =
etUt
Vt
(E.16)
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 Matching function
Ht = B (etUt)
 V 1 t (E.17)
 Probability of nding a job
pwt =
Ht
etUt
(E.18)
 Probability of lling a vacancy
pft =
Ht
Vt
(E.19)
 Ex-post (involuntary) unemployment:
J bt = U
b
t  Hbt (E.20)
 Total employment:
Nt = !N
b
t (E.21)
 Total hiring:
Ht = !H
b
t (E.22)
 Total involuntary unemployment:
Jt = !J
b
t (E.23)
 Total ex-ante unemployment.
Ut = !U
b
t (E.24)
 Marginal product of a worker
MPNt = 
"  1
"
AtK
1 
t 1 [LtNt]
 1 Lt (E.25)
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 Firmssurplus
Sft =MPNt  WtLt + (1  )

pft
(E.26)
 Borrowerssurplus
Sbt =
1  

Sft (E.27)
 The prot maximization condition for the intermediate good sector V :

pft
= E

st+1
st

Sft+1

(E.28)
 Marginal product of capital
MPKt = (1  ) P
I
t
Pt
AtK
 
t 1 [LtNt]
 (E.29)
 The prot maximization condition for the intermediate good sector K
MPKt = R
k
t   1 (E.30)
 The pricing equation for the nal good sector:
P It
Pt
=
"  1
"
(E.31)
 The prot equation:
Tt = Yt  WtLtNt  
 
Rkt   1

Kt 1   Vt (E.32)
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 Wage setting:
WtLt =
 
2
(1  et)1 'e
1  'e
  1 (1  Lt)
1 '
1  '
!
1
bt
+
+
(1  )

"
Sft   (1     pwt et) E
(
bt+1
bt

Sft+1
)#
 t
 
N bt
 1
Et

1
bt
Qt+1
Rt
Dbt

;
or
WtLt =
 
2
(1  et)1 'e
1  'e
  1 (1  Lt)
1 '
1  '
!
1
bt
(E.33)
+
"
Sbt   (1     pwt et) E
(
bt+1
bt
 
Sbt+1
)#  t  N bt  1Et 1
bt
Qt+1
Rt
Dbt

;
 Marginal product of hours per marginal worker
MPNLt = 
2 "  1
"
AtK
1 
t 1 L
 1
t N
 1
t (E.34)
 Equilibrium hours:
MPNLt = 1 (1  Lt) ' 1
bt
(E.35)
 E¤ort decision
2 (1  et) 'e 1
bt
= pwt E

Sbt+1
	
(E.36)
 Market clearing for credit:
!Bbt + (1  !)Bst = 0 (E.37)
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 Market clearing for durables:
!Dbt + (1  !)Dst = D (E.38)
 Aggregate consumption
!Cbt + (1  !)Cst = Ct (E.39)
 Aggregate capital
Kt = (1  !)Kst (E.40)
 Saversprots:
T st =
Tt
1  ! (E.41)
 Output:
Yt = AtK
1 
t 1 (NtLt)
 (E.42)
 Technology:
logAt = 
A logAt 1 + "At (E.43)
 Durables demand shock
log  t = (1   ) +  log  t 1 + "t (E.44)
 Financial shock
logt = (1  )+  logt 1 + "t (E.45)
